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We construct objective measures of privatization, internal and external 
liberalization reform efforts, across countries over time, and investigate their 
determinants, reversals and macroeconomic impacts. We find that GDP growth 
determines external liberalization and privatization, concentration of political power 
drives internal liberalization, and democracy underpins all three. We find that FDI 
inflows reduce the probability of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that 
of internal liberalization reversals, and terms of trade shocks increase that of 
external liberalization reversals. We replicate previous studies and find that the 
macroeconomic effects of reform (when measured objectively) tend to be larger and 
more precisely estimated. 
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In the last two decades, profound changes in economic policy took place around the world 
culminating with the almost simultaneous pronouncement of the “Washington Consensus” 
and the fall of communism. Although the literature on political economy of reform is large, 
prominent and fast growing, it is still essentially theoretical. Empirical testing of the various 
(sometimes conflicting) hypotheses is rare. According to two authoritative reviews (Drazen, 
2000, and Persson and Tabellini, 2000)
1, the empirical evidence has yet to materialise in 
large part because the reforms we focus on here (e.g., privatization) share elements of both 
“stroke of the pen national policies” (Easterly, 2006) and harder to change “institutions” 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2006). One would expect that research on the former 
communist countries (that is, on those countries that during the 1990s have implemented 
large-scale economic reforms) would provide such empirical evidence at once, but that has 
not happened either.
2  
                                                           
1 These authors identify one single empirical study for developing countries, namely Lora 
(1997) for Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  
2 Campos and Coricelli conclude their survey noting that: “more emphasis should be placed 
upon a better understanding of the role of economic reforms and reform strategies in dictating the path 
of the transition process (…) There are a number of theoretical models that stress the role of reform 
  1The theoretical literature on economic reform started out examining positive issues 
(such as, how can we explain that socially beneficial reforms are not implemented?) and has 
evolved towards a more difficult task, namely tackling normative questions, such as how can 
reform packages be designed so that they overcome political resistance.
3 Fernandez and 
Rodrik (1991) present a seminal model of status quo bias. Their basic intuition is that 
individual- specific uncertainty over the outcome of a reform (that is, who will be the winners 
and who will be the losers) leads a majority of voters to expect to loose from reform ex ante, 
even though everybody knows that a majority will gain from reform ex post. If reform is 
implemented, the losers will be a minority so they do not have the political power to reverse 
the reform while the winners (from reform) cannot credibly promise to compensate the losers 
ex post. Another seminal paper is Alesina and Drazen (1991), which treat implementation 
delays in a war of attrition model. This generates an important hypothesis (for which we find 
support below), regarding political fractionalization. Governments will not need to negotiate 
how to allocate the short term cost of reforms if they have a stable majority in parliament. 
Dewatripont and Roland provide various influential models of reform dynamics inspired by 
the transition from communism (1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b). They stress the role of 
uncertainty about the outcome of reforms in terms of the government choice of 
implementation sequence. Comparing big-bang with gradualist reform strategies, they argue 
the latter is easier to implement
 because it involves learning and experimentation.
4 Although 
the theoretical arguments for sequencing seem to have been vindicated by the emergence of 
the so-called second-generation reforms, a number of authors have spelled out the case for a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
strategies. Yet the data for discriminating among these models is lacking. The few indicators available 
are unnecessarily subjective (…)” (2002, p. 831, italics added).  
3 For surveys of the literature, see Asilis and Milesi-Ferreti (1994), Rodrik (1996) Bhattacharya 
(1997), Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Kuczynski and Williamson (2003).   
4 On the role of learning in reform dynamics see also Goodhue, Rausser and Simon (1998) and 
Schroder (2001). Correctly sequenced reforms also create constituencies for further reforms. Collier 
  2big bang strategy. The main arguments for the latter include the costs of partial reforms, time-
consistency issues, and the advantages of a political honeymoon in which credibility provide 
an opportunity to implement painful measures.
  5 One central element in the Dewatripont-
Roland models is the role of reform reversals: reformers try to design reform packages that 
incorporate costs of reversal that are high enough to deter political resistance (see also 
Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). Finally, a powerful idea in this literature is that crises 
trigger economic reforms (see Drazen and Grilli, 1993). The argument is that the political, or 
informational, impediments to reform may be so large that reform will not be implemented 
unless a crisis occurs because a larger share of the population benefits from reform in the 
aftermath of a crisis (Drazen and Easterly, 2001).
 
There have been few efforts to test empirically the main propositions from the 
theoretical literature. One reason being the lack of comprehensive reform measures.
6 In other 
words, there are a number of studies that focus on one reform and/or on one country but few 
that focus on multiple reforms in more than one country over time. For instance, two reform 
areas that have received a great deal of attention across countries and over time are financial 
liberalization and privatization.
7  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and Gunning (1999) argue that a main reason for the poor performance of IMF-supported structural 
adjustment programs is inattention to sequencing.   
5 Martinelli and Tommasi (1997) argue that even when gradualism is the choice of an 
unconstrained social planner, time-consistency considerations may force simultaneous 
implementation of all possible reforms. In their model, the time-inconsistency of the “optimal reform 
sequences” arises because winners from early reforms will oppose any later reforms that may hurt 
them. Knowing that, losers from early reforms will oppose the earlier measures and require additional 
compensation. Lipton and Sachs (1990) advocate that reformers should introduce simultaneously and 
in a comprehensive way all elements of a market economy, taking advantage of the political 
honeymoon to implement painful reforms on a stroke. Murphy et al (1992) argue that introducing 
partial reforms would eliminate their positive effects and disorganize the economy. 
6 As noted, the measurement of economic reforms was pioneered by Lora (1997, 2001), which 
consider five reforms: trade, tax, financial, privatization and labor market regulation. These are 
aggregated in a structural policy index for 20 Latin American countries yearly from 1985 to 1995. 
7 On privatization, Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an extensive review of the evidence, 
while on financial liberalization, important recent contributions are those by Kaminsky and 
Schmuckler (2003) and Abiad and Mody (2005). 
  3Note that measures of reform efforts during the transition from communism have been 
constructed by international organizations, such as the World Bank and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In our view, these indicators are unsatisfactory 
for at least five reasons. One is that it is rather difficult to know which are the exact variables 
underlying each reform measure.
8 Second, it is not disclosed how the reform scores are 
generated (that is, how the potential set of underlying variables translate into the overall 
reform measures). Third, among the listed (potential) underlying variables one finds policy 
inputs as well as outcomes (for instance, for external liberalization, one can find tariff levels 
as well as trade openness). Fourth, there are various instances in which the overall reform 
score was revised despite the “underlying data” remaining unchanged, which suggests that 
the algorithm may well have changed. Fifth
 and finally, the existing reform measures are 
benchmarked against an imprecisely defined reference point (for instance, an “advance 
industrial economy”). One main reason for these potential problems is that these existing 
reform indicators are subjective. They are based on the judgement of country specialists at 
the World Bank (de Melo et al., 1996) and at the EBRD.
9 Expert opinion might be swayed by 
ex post reports of favourable or unfavourable performance. However, differently from some 
measures of institutions (e.g., rule of law), measures of reform need not be subjective.
10  
The period after the collapse of communism in Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union provides for what is arguably the largest natural experiment on economic reform in 
recent history and it is paradoxical that objective indicators of reform are still unavailable.
11 
                                                           
8 The World Bank produced three reform indexes for the transition economies for the period 
1989 to 1997, while the EBRD has a set of nine indicators starting in 1991. These indexes and their 
potential problems are discussed in greater detail in section 2. 
9  For instance, “The transition indicators scores in Chapter 1 reflect the judgement of the 
EBRD’s Office of the Chief Economist about country-specific progress in transition” (EBRD, 2004, 
p. 119, italics added). 
10 See also Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Scheilfer (2004).  
11 Campos, Hsiao and Nugent (2005) find that large cross-country samples do not pass standard 
poolability tests and on this basis argue for analyses at the regional level. In light of the abundance of 
  4This paper tries to address this gap. More precisely, the objective of this paper is two-fold. 
One is to construct objective measures of privatisation, external and internal liberalisation 
reform efforts for up to 25 Eastern European and former Soviet Union economies between 
1989 and 2001. The second is to use these new measures to shed light on various hypotheses 
from the theoretical literature on the political economy of reform.  
How are these reform measures constructed? Firstly, we compile an extensive set of 
underlying variables, yielding almost 30 variables for external liberalization, 3 for internal 
liberalization and about 12 for privatization.
12 Secondly, in terms of ways to normalize and 
aggregate these data, we investigate, inter alia, simple averages, principal components and 
the one proposed by Lora (1997) and decided for the latter on the basis of it being the 
simplest, most transparent as well as the one method that has been used in the reform 
literature (see also Loayza, Oviedo and Serven, 2005).
 Thirdly, we classify these underlying 
objective indicators into “input” and “outcome” indicators of reform in order to generate 
input-only measures. This last point is crucial as we believe it is one way of addressing the 
Rodrik critique (2005) according to which we learn little from regressions of growth on 
policies because existing measures seldom isolate effort from reform outcomes. If outcomes 
receive a high weight in the index (this should be expected if they are subjective), then 
regressing indexes heavily weighted towards outcomes on outcomes themselves clearly 
should not be very informative. Fourthly, and finally, we subject our indexes to various 
robustness tests by (a) excluding outcome indicators (or conversely, by examining our 
preferred input-only measures of reform), (b) assessing reform dynamics across countries for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
case studies on the subject of reform, this provides another reason to focus on one region only as we 
do here.   
12 By focusing on internal and external liberalization efforts we try to go beyond price and trade 
liberalization. By internal liberalization we mean price and wage liberalization, while external 
liberalization is defined here to include the liberalization of trade as well as of capital flows.  
  5various sub-periods and (c) comparing our objective indexes with those from the EBRD and 
World Bank. 
Our main findings are as follows. Compared to the existing subjective measures, ours 
generate a less optimistic assessment of the reform process, depicting it as much less smooth 
than previously thought (in other words, we find that reform reversals abound). Among the 
main determinants of reform, we find domestic GDP growth for external liberalization and 
privatisation, concentration of political power for internal liberalisation, and democracy for 
the three of them. We also find that inflows of foreign direct investment reduce the 
probability of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal liberalization 
reversals, and negative terms of trade shocks increase the likelihood of an external 
liberalization reversal. Finally, we replicate various econometric studies on the effects of 
reform on growth and find that those effects, using our objective measures of reform, are 
larger and more precisely estimated. 
We note at the outset that we leave one major topic for future research. The two central 
issues in the political economy of reform literature are reversals and optimal sequencing. We 
have dealt extensively with the former in this paper, but have strong reasons to leave the 
latter for future efforts. This is despite our results being somewhat clear in this respect: our 
set of countries seems to have implemented reform by first advancing internal liberalization, 
then external liberalization and finally privatization. This sequence is observed even in the 
countries that went the farthest in privatizing and opening up their economies. Because we 
have focused on only three reform areas, the number of potential sequences of reform is 
limited. We are convinced that disaggregating our three indexes is vital for a deeper 
examination of sequencing issues.
 For instance, from the raw data we can identify that wage 
liberalization was preceded by price liberalization in most countries (these are two 
components of our internal liberalization index).  
  6The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the existing 
measures of reform. Section 3 present our new objective reform indicators and benchmark 
them against the subjective indicators used in most of the literature. Section 4 compares the 
performance of our indicators with that of the existing indicators in terms of the determinants 
of reform and in terms of growth implications. Section 5 concludes and presents some 
suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Potential Drawbacks of Existing Measures 
International organizations are the main source of indicators of reform for our sample of 
countries. Such indexes have been constructed by The World Bank and the EBRD. The 
World Bank started this work in the early 1990s by putting forward three reform indicators, 
covering privatization and internal and external liberalization efforts. Later on, the EBRD 
took over this task and improved upon the early set by offering many more (nine) indicators, 
covering finer, more detailed aspects of reform. The two sets of indexes are constructed in a 
similar manner, namely in three steps: (1) a comprehensive set of underlying objective 
variables is collected, (2) a common scale and weighting scheme is agreed upon, and (3) 
country and sector specialists study these data, judge them and agree on individual scores on 
each reform item for each country in each year (the top score is set to reflect the standards 
and performance typical of those in advanced industrial countries.)  
One main advantage of this approach is the ability to quality-weight the data. 
Consider, for instance, a government that chooses to manipulate the data because it believes 
that if more favourable figures are presented this would increase the likelihood of receiving a 
loan from an international organization or to improve the terms of that loan. Subjective 
indexes can to some extent discount, or give a lower weight to, such information. Another 
  7main advantage is that these indexes are available in a balanced panel format for all transition 
economies and for all years since 1991. 
The data effort carried out at the World Bank is presented in the World Development 
Report 1996 as well as in de Melo et al. (1997). Their overall liberalization index is a 
weighted average of scores from three areas: (1) internal markets (liberalization of domestic 
prices and the abolition of state trading monopolies), (2) external markets (liberalization of 
the foreign trade regime, including elimination of export controls and taxes, and substitution 
of low-to-moderate import duties for import quotas and current account convertibility), and 
(3) private sector entry (privatization of small-scale and large-scale enterprises and banking 
reform.) The weights for this overall liberalization index are determined by expert judgment 
and set as follows: 0.3 for internal, 0.3 for external liberalization and 0.4 for privatization.   
The nine EBRD (2004) reform indicators are as follows: large-scale privatization, 
small-scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade 
and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate 
liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and infrastructure 
reform. For this paper, the EBRD indexes on price and external liberalization and 
privatization are of particular interest. Regarding price liberalization, the EBRD surveys 
national authorities and also uses IMF country reports to determine the share of administered 
(i.e., regulated by the government) prices in the Consumer Price Index as well as the number 
of goods with administered prices in the so-called EBRD-15 basket.
13 The EBRD also 
provides information on whether or not wages are regulated. Concerning external 
liberalization, the EBRD reports on the share of trade in GDP, share of trade with non-
transition economies and tariff revenues (in percentage of imports, it includes all revenues 
                                                           
13 The basket consists of following 15 goods and services: flour/bread, meat, milk, gasoline, 
cotton textiles, shoes, paper, cars, TV sets, cement, steel, coal, wood, housing rents and intercity bus 
service. 
  8from international trade and imports are those of merchandise trade). With respect to 
privatization, the EBRD surveys national authorities for data on, inter alia, the share of 
privatized enterprises and the estimated share of private sector output and employment to 
GDP and total employment, respectively. The EBRD then creates aggregate indexes, one for 
price liberalization, for foreign exchange and trade liberalization, and for small- and large-
scale privatization.
14  
These indexes take values from “1” to “4+.” For example, regarding price 
liberalization, higher values of the index are associated with a smaller extent of regulated 
prices. Thus a score of 1 is obtained when most prices are controlled by the government. A 
score of 2 stands for some lifting of price administration, yet the state still sets the majority of 
prices. A score of 3 is reserved for significant progress in price liberalization, but still some 
involvement of the state in price regulation. A score of 4 stands for comprehensive price 
liberalization when only a small number of administered prices remain. A score of 4+ means 
that standards and performance are typical to those of advanced industrial countries with no 
price control outside housing, transport and natural monopolies. 
  What are the main problems we identify with these efforts? We identify five   
potential problems: (1) lack of information regarding which are the variables that make up 
each index; (2) lack of information regarding how the underlying variables are combined into 
the aggregate indexes; (3) the fact that in the lists of potential underlying variables presented 
in the above mentioned reports one finds policy inputs as well as policy outcomes; (4) that 
the indexes change without attendant changes in the underlying data; and (5) that these 
indexes maximum score refers to an ill-defined reference point such as a “well-functioning 
market economy” or an “advance industrial economy.” 
                                                           
14 Note that the price liberalization index was revised in 2003. The revision stressed the 
distinction between state price controls and utility price regulation. The improved index focuses solely 
on state price controls (see EBRD Transition report 2003, p. 18).  
  9Let us now expand a bit on each one of these potential problems. One first problem 
we identify is the difficulty in knowing the exact variables underlying each reform indicator.
 
More precisely, accompanying each index one invariably finds a (sometimes large) number 
of related variables. Yet, a statement indicating exactly which one of these variables is used 
in computing each reform index is not provided. 
 A second potential problem is that it is very difficult to know exactly how the reform 
scores are generated. In other words, we were not able to find a description of how the set of 
underlying variables are translated into the overall scores. Notice that in the World Bank 
case, we know how each individual reform indicator is weighted in an overall reform index. 
But this is not what we have in mind here. In this case, we know how an aggregate reform 
index is constructed (that is, we do not know which variables are taken into account and what 
are the weights attached to each one of them) but we do not know how each of the three 
individual components are constructed (that is, an exact list of underlying variables and set of 
weights are not provided). The same issue holds with respect to the EBRD indexes.   
Third, and in our view the most important issue, is that in the list of underlying 
variables provided, one finds policy inputs as well as outcomes. For example, in the list of 
potential underlying variables often presented for external liberalization, one can find tariff 
levels as well as trade openness. As noted, Rodrik (2005) argues that we learn little from 
cross-country regressions of growth on reform because, inter alia, the literature does not 
isolate effort from outcomes when measuring reform. Loayza and Soto (2004) and Glaeser et 
al. (2004) also make this important point. 
Fourth, there are many instances in which the overall reform score have been revised 
despite the fact that the “underlying data” remained unchanged, which suggests that the 
algorithm may well have changed.
15 This is rather surprising. It is well-known that statistical 
                                                           
15 Another possibility is that learning occurred. There are many examples of such changes, but 
  10offices in the former communist countries were excellent in measuring output and 
employment (in physical terms) but were unprepared to deal with say inflation and 
unemployment (Bartholdy, 1997). One would expect the underlying data to be revised first, 
not the indexes. 
Fifth and finally, existing reform indicators are not continuous and are also 
benchmarked against an imprecisely defined reference point. They are categorical variables 
taking values from 1 to 4+, the latter reflecting the level of liberalization achieved in an 
“advance industrial economy.” In an important paper, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) show 
that “advance industrial economies” are highly heterogeneous with respect to the 
implementation of economic reforms which diminishes the usefulness of this comparator.    
 
3. Constructing New Measures of Reform 
The objective of this section is to present our new objective indexes of reform for 25 former 
communist economies for all years between 1989 and 2001. We constructed three indexes of 
reform.
 The first captures internal liberalization efforts and thus reflects the extent of price 
and wage liberalization. The second captures external liberalization efforts and reflects the 
severity of trade barriers and capital controls. The third index captures privatization reform 
efforts.
 In addition to reporting on the construction of these indexes, we also examine their 
robustness by (a) excluding outcome indicators (or conversely, by examining input-only 
measures of reform), (b) assessing reform dynamics across countries for various sub-periods, 
and (c) comparing our measures with those from the EBRD and World Bank.  
In constructing our indexes, we of course want to address each of the major 
drawbacks we identify in the existing measures. More specifically (and referring to the 
individual potential problems discussed in the previous section), our goal is to be as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
arguably none less pronounced than the revisions one can observe in the scores for the Baltic 
  11transparent and explicit as possible regarding (1) what are the underlying variables that make 
up each of our three reform indexes, (2) how the underlying variables are combined into each 
of the reform indexes, (3) how we separate out reform efforts inputs from reform outcomes, 
(4) how our indexes change over time and relate these changes to changes in the underlying 
variables, and (5) how we use the in-sample maximum value of each index as a reference 
point (as opposed to an ideal “well-functioning market economy”). 
We set out to construct objective indexes of reform for 25 countries for all years 
between 1989 and 2001.
16 This time window covers the period immediately following the 
collapse of communism as well as the late transition period (that is, the years following the 
Russian crisis of August 1998).  
What are the underlying variables that make up each of our three reform indexes? 
Altogether, we collect data on 44 underlying variables. Three of them assess the extent of 
internal liberalization; twenty-nine correspond to the measure of external liberalization and 
the remaining twelve variables capture the extent of privatization. These underlying variables 
for each of our three reform indexes are listed in Table 1 (which also shows how we choose 
to separate reform inputs from outcomes, more on this issue below).
17   
Regarding internal liberalization, we collected data for the following indicators: the 
number of goods subject to price regulation in the 15 goods EBRD basket, the share of 
administered prices in the consumer price index (CPI), and wage regulation. The latter is a 
dummy variable reported in the EBRD Transition Report and is admittedly a very rough 
measure of labour market liberalization. The other two underlying variables also originate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
countries in subsequent versions of the World Bank papers and of the EBRD’s Transition Reports. 
16 These are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldavia, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro were excluded for lack of data. 
17 A detailed appendix with information on the definition, coding and source for each one of 
these variables is available from the authors upon request.   
  12from the EBRD Transition Report, although we have contacted all the 25 national statistical 
offices and Ministries of Finance (and/or Economy) for assistance in double-checking and 
filling any remaining data gaps. Out of our three reform indexes, the internal liberalization 
measure is clearly the closest to the existing indexes (except in that it also includes wage 
regulation). As discussed below in more detail, despite this resemblance when we examine 
the correlation coefficients between ours and the existing reforms measures, those for internal 
liberalization turn out surprisingly to be lower than those for external liberalization and 
privatization. 
Regarding external liberalization, the variables underlying our index are more 
numerous and it is thus very different from the other (subjective) indexes. Ours contain 29 
measures of capital controls and trade barriers. Capital controls indicators are as follows: 
controls on commercial credit, controls on foreign direct investment, controls on the 
liquidation of foreign direct investment, documentation requirements for the release of 
foreign exchange for imports, exchange rate taxes, interest rate liberalization, investment   
liberalization, multiple exchange rates, permission requirements for foreign exchange 
accounts held abroad by residents, permission requirements for foreign exchange accounts 
held domestically by residents, permission requirements for foreign exchange accounts for 
non-residents, repatriation requirements, repatriation requirements for invisible transactions, 
surrender requirements and surrender requirements for invisible transactions.  Data on trade 
barriers include the following: compatibility with Article VIII (current account 
convertibility), export duties as percentage of tax revenues, export licences, export taxes, 
import duties as percentage of tax revenue, import licences and quotas, import tariff rate, 
OECD and WTO membership, trade openness, share of trade with non-transition countries, 
tariff code lines, tariff revenues as percentage of imports, and tax revenues on international 
trade (as percentage of revenue). 
  13The underlying variables for external liberalization come from various sources. One 
main source of data is the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (Bodenstein, Plumper and Schneider, 2003).
  Additional data sources are the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, UNCTAD’s Handbook of Trade Statistics, 
EBRD’s Transition Reports, Penn World Tables 6.1 and IMF, OECD and WTO web-sites. 
We have again contacted all 25 national statistical offices and Ministries of Finance (and/or 
Economy) for assistance in filling data gaps. 
Our privatization index is based upon the following variables: privatization revenues 
as percent of GDP, the share of small firms privatized, the ratio of assets of private-owned 
banks to assets of all banks, total number of enterprises privatized, total cumulative number 
of private enterprises, total number of small and medium enterprises privatized, total number 
of large enterprises privatized, share of foreign-owned banks over total number of banks, 
private sector share in GDP, credit to private sector, private sector share of employment and 
private sector investment. The sources of the underlying variables for our privatization 
measure come from various sources: IMF’s International Financial Statistics, WB’s ECSPF 
database, EBRD’s Transition Reports, and  EBRD survey to Central Banks and national 
authorities.
  We have also in this case contacted all 25 national statistical offices and 
Ministries of Finance (and/or Economy) for assistance in filling data gaps. 
How are these underlying variables combined into each of the reform indexes? There 
are many aggregation methods to generate indexes of privatization, internal and external 
liberalization. Two obvious candidates are simple arithmetic averages and principal 
components. One major drawback of simple averages is that when we have so many different 
underlying variables in different units and scales, the ensuing values of the indexes would be 
difficult to interpret. One major drawback of principal components is that maximum and 
minimum values of the resulting indexes are entirely determined by the data and have no 
  14clear economic meaning.
18 For these two reasons, we choose to apply the methodology 
developed by Lora (1997).  One important advantage of Lora’s method is that it has been 
developed and used previously for similar purposes (that is, to capture various reform efforts 
across countries and over time). Our overall index I for i-th country is constructed as follows:   
























    (1) 
where V is a value of j-th variable in i-th country in time t. n stands for the number of the 
years (typically 13 years) and m for the number of variables (maximum of 35). Also note that 
1 , 0 ∈ V  for all i, t, which is because we normalize the ‘raw’ V value of the j-th variable by 
the maximal value observed in all countries in time t.
  Notice that, firstly, in the case of year-
by-year indexes, we do not average over time and thus all terms containing n drop out. 
Secondly, the equation holds when the higher values of underlying variable indicate less 
reform (for the opposite case, the numerator become the difference between the actual value 
and the observed minimum). 
A major advantage of the Lora transformation is that the reference point is within the 
sample. In other words, this method does not require to benchmark reform efforts against an 
ideal “well-functioning market economy.” Our reference point is the maximum reform effort 
observed across our sample of countries in the respective time window. The major cost of this 
choice is that enlarging the time window and/or the sample of countries can potentially affect 
the values of our indexes. Needless to say, we believe that this drawback is preferable to 
those of benchmarking against something that cannot be defined with sufficient precision, 
neither across countries nor over time.  
In aggregating the underlying variables, we must address the issue of weights. In our 
view, it is impossible to determine the ‘true’ set of weights. Further, these weights probably 
                                                           
18 Simple averages and principal components versions of our indexes are available upon request. 
  15change from country to country and over time. As a result, we decided it is more transparent 
to use equal weights for all underlying variables. This can clearly be improved upon, 
although this would be difficult to accomplish in a non-arbitrary manner. 
How do we separate out reform inputs from reform outcomes? The distinction 
between input and output variables is not always clear cut. When measuring reform, it is 
advisable to focus on the indicators that are directly under the control of the government 
(Rodrik, 1996; Loayza and Soto 2003). Including outcome indicators in the construction of 
aggregate reform indexes may introduce bias in estimating the degree of liberalization. This 
is so for the simple reason that outcome indicators can be the result of many things other than 
reform inputs.
19 In addition, it may well be the case that there is a time lag between reform 
inputs and reform outputs. Therefore, we construct input-only measures for the three reform 
policies yearly for 25 former communist economies, but also compute indicators combining 
inputs and outcomes as a robustness check. Our prior is that the correlations between the 
existing reform indexes will be lower with respect to our input-only indexes (which are the 
ones we prefer) than with respect to our indexes that combine reform inputs and outcomes. 
As noted below, our results support this statement which can be taken as evidence that the 
existing subjective indicators do indeed mix inputs and outcomes (although we can not be 
sure of that as the precise lists of underlying variables are seldom provided).   
Notice also that in selecting reform outcomes variables we want to minimize the 
probability that a “true reform input” is mistakenly classified as a “reform outcome.” By 
doing that, the resulting list of reform outcomes may contain variables that are clearly reform 
outcomes and, conversely, the list of reform inputs will contain variables for which a certain 
level of reform outcomes is present. The reason for doing this is to try to “stack the cards” 
                                                           
19 For instance, the share of trade with non-transition countries may be strongly affected by the 
geographical proximity to non-transition countries. Therefore this variable should not be included in 
an input-only index of external liberalization efforts. 
  16against our indexes as this will surely minimize the differences (over time and across 
countries) between ours and the existing reforms measures. We consider as outcome 
indicators the following variables (the first column of Table 1 list reform inputs, while the 
second lists reform outcomes). For internal liberalization, we single out as an outcome 
indicator the share of administered prices in CPI. This is because this is a function of the 
share of non-administered prices in CPI. Thus if the introduction of new goods is beyond the 
control of government’s internal liberalization policies so is the total number of goods 
(prices) in the economy. For external liberalization, we consider as outcome variables the 
share of trade with non-transition countries, openness, import duties as percent of tax 
revenues, tariff revenues as percent of imports and the taxes collected on international trade. 
For privatization, we consider as outcome variables the private sector share in GDP, credit to 
private sector and private sector investment.   
How do our input-only objectives indexes of reform change across countries and over 
time? There are two general observations we need to make at the outset. The first is that the 
correlation coefficients among our measures of reforms are all positive, but rather low. The 
correlation between internal and external liberalization is 0.48, between internal and 
privatization is 0.39 and between external liberalization and privatization is 0.66.   
The second general observation refers to reform reversals. While reform measured by 
the World Bank and EBRD indexes is better portrayed as a smooth, uninterrupted process of 
continuous improvement (note that this is even more so when considering the cumulative 
version of those indexes), it is a much more turbulent process according to our measures. 
Ours show a fair amount of trial and error and experimentation which translates in the 
occurrence of numerous reform policy reversals. This matters because reform reversals are at 
the heart of the theoretical literature (e.g., Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). Merlevede (2003) 
calculates reform reversals using the EBRD indexes and reports 21 cases in which the 
  17subsequent value of a reform indicator is lower than the current value (we also adopt this 
definition of reform reversal here). Because this is from a total of 237 changes, it implies that 
reversals observed in 8.9 percent of the cases. Also note that Merlevede considers reversals 
across all nine EBRD reform indicators. Considering just our three indexes, we obtain a much 
larger number of reversals, we find: 42 reversals out of 295 (14.2%) in the internal 
liberalization reform indicator; 61 reversals out of 300 (20.3%) in the external liberalization 
reform indicator; and 44 reversals out of 243 (18.1%) in the reform indicator for privatization 
efforts. Further, using the EBRD reform measures Merlevede (2003) finds that only half of 
the countries experienced reform reversals. According to our indexes basically all countries 
have experience at least one reversal in one of the three reform dimensions we consider.
20  
 
3.1 Internal Liberalization Index 
Figure 1 shows our input-only internal liberalisation index on a yearly basis for all the 25 
countries in our sample.
21 Overall, there is clear progress across countries over time in terms 
of the liberalization of prices and wages. Notice, however, that reform reversals abound. As 
for example, in Albania and Ukraine in 1997, Lithuania in 1995 and Uzbekistan in 1994. 
Most of these seem related to wage regulation, which plays a significant role in the index. For 
example, Lithuania according to our data stopped regulating wages in 1995 and consequently 
the value of the index increases accordingly. Similarly, a large drop in the value of index for 
Uzbekistan is a result of introducing wage controls in July 1994 (Anderson and Pomfret, 
2002). Albania deregulated wages in 1997 resulting in a large increase in the value of the 
index. Slovakia and Ukraine reintroduced wage regulation in the years 1997-1998 and the 
                                                           
20 Given the small numbers of reversals previous studies found, it is common practice to 
comment on each one of them. There are too many reform reversals in our data to comment on each 
one of them individually (we do comment on a selected few below), therefore in the following section 
we provide an econometric analysis of the determinants of reform reversals.  
21 See Appendix 1 for country-specific data. 
  18value of index declines accordingly. This is as good a moment as any to highlight the fact that 
these jumps could easily have been put aside if we, for example, chose to weight wage 
regulation in a different manner. For instance, if we arbitrarily halve its weight then the 
overall index would appear smoother than it actually is. Because this particular index is 
composed by very few variables which are equally weighted, any changes in the underlying 
variables will have large consequences in terms of the aggregate index.
 22  
In terms of the overall ranking of countries, we find Kazakhstan highly placed. 
Although this is somewhat surprising, it can easily be explained by tracing the index through 
its underlying variables: Kazakhstan has the lowest number of goods subject to price 
regulation and the lowest possible score for wage regulation for all 25 countries during 7 of 
the 13 years (1989 to 2001). The second and third places are (less surprisingly) occupied by 
Estonia and Hungary, respectively, while at the bottom of the ranking we find Romania, 
Belarus, Russia and Moldova. Countries such as Albania or Georgia made great progress in 
terms of price and wage liberalization only more recently. On the other hand, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan seem to have moved towards greater regulation over time. Overall, the 
internal liberalization index seems unaffected by the exclusion of outcome variables and to 
splitting the time window. The Baltic countries and countries from the Caucasus seem to be 
slightly more liberalized in terms of price and wage regulation. Using the input-only index, 
we still find the ranking topped by Estonia, Kazakhstan and Hungary. At the bottom, we find 
Moldavia and Belarus which few observers would find surprising. 
How do these measures compare to the existing subjective indicators? Note that the 
EBRD liberalization indexes cover the years 1991-2001 and the World Bank index developed 
by de Melo et al. (1996) is available only for 1989-1997. Thus, correlation coefficients are 
based only on the years for which all the corresponding data are available. The correlation 
                                                           
22 The source of most pre-1991 data for the former Soviet Union countries is national 
  19between our input-only internal liberalization index with the EBRD’s is 0.52 and with the 
World Bank’s is 0.38, while the correlation between our index combining inputs and 
outcomes is 0.42 with the World Bank’s and 0.56 with the same EBRD’s index.
23 As noted, 
while our measure is at first sight very similar to the EBRD’s, the correlation between them is 
lower than in the cases of external liberalization and privatization (see below).  
Figures 2 and 3 show the behaviour of our internal liberalization index over time, 
when we divide the sample into two groups, namely Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). CIS include all former Soviet 
Union republics except the Baltic States. For the sake of comparison, we normalize the 
EBRD indexes in that smaller values refer to less liberalization effort. We present the two 
indexes in Figures 1-3 below. Visual comparison suggests that the EBRD may have been 
somewhat more generous in rating internal liberalization in the CEEC vis-à-vis the CIS, and 
this may have been particularly so for the period 1989-1995.    
 
3.2 External Liberalization Index 
Our external liberalisation index is shown in Figure 4. It is worth noting that, as it is the case 
with the internal liberalisation index, the EBRD external index clearly indicates more 
liberalisation on average than our index for all years but 2001 (although the gap between the 
measures early on is not as great as in the case of internal liberalisation). Except for 2001 
(marginally), our indexes suggest that external liberalisation efforts were less intensive, on 
average, than internal liberalisation efforts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
authorities.   
23 If we use only data in the period of 1997-2001, the coefficient falls slightly to 0.49 for both 
our indexes (with and without outcome indicators). The correlation of our index with WB index in the 
years 1989-1994 is 0.42 and 0.38 after excluding the outcome indicators. If we extend the WB index 
to include the years up to 1997, the corresponding correlation coefficient rises to 0.48, respectively 
0.53. Additionally, the correlation between our internal liberalization index with and without the 
outcome indicators stands at 0.97. 
  20In terms of the overall ranking of countries, we find Latvia on top closely followed by 
Estonia (see Appendix 1). The third post is (maybe) surprisingly occupied by Kyrgyzstan and 
this is because of extremely high values for external reform effort from 1993 onwards across 
the range of 29 variables underlying our index. At the bottom of the ranking we have 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Albania. The greatest jump we observe in the value of index is 
for Turkmenistan in 1999. Examining the underlying variables, we find that Turkmenistan, 
inter alia, liberalized interest rates and abolished multiple exchange rates in 1999. Other 
examples worth mentioning are: Uzbekistan reintroduced severe exchange rate controls as a 
reaction to a balance of payments crisis in the autumn of 1996 (Pomfret, 2000). This is 
reflected in the large decline in the value of its external liberalization index from 0.32 in 1996 
to 0.24 in 1997.  
One issue that is important to keep in mind is that there is considerably more variation 
in terms of external liberalisation both across countries and over time than it is the case for 
internal liberalisation so a closer analysis of the trajectories of each country is worthwhile: we 
learn that there are more cases of policy reversal but none of them as severe as the ones seen 
for price liberalization. Admittedly, this can be caused by the smaller number of underlying 
variables for the latter measure. 
Examining the relative rankings, the results are in line with expectation both for the 
top and for the bottom countries. Indeed for the top three it is maybe mildly surprising that 
the Baltics are still such intensive reformers even in the very late transition years. The 
external liberalization indexes show that the highest average values were found for the Czech 
Republic, Latvia and Estonia while the lowest values were for Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Belarus. As noted, the correlation coefficients between our external liberalization and the 
EBRD’s and World Bank’s indexes are higher than for internal liberalization. The correlation 
  21with the World Bank’s is 0.73 and with the EBRD’s is 0.81, while the same coefficients for 
our input-only external liberalization indexes are lower, at 0.65 and 0.79, respectively.
24  
Figures 4 to 6 show that our external liberalization indexes never “crosses” the EBRD 
index after 1991, in other words, the EBRD index indicates more liberalisation on average 
than our index for almost all years. Again, the gap tends to be larger for the CEEC than for 
the former Soviet Union countries. 
 
3.3 Privatization Index 
Figure 7 presents our privatization index. Concerning country-specific results, it is worth 
noting that only Hungary and Poland privatized their economies, to a certain extent, before 
1991. Generally, Hungary shows the greatest extent of privatization, followed by Slovakia, 
Macedonia and Latvia. On the other hand, Belarus and Turkmenistan have made the least 
progress in privatization. It is interesting to note that for the most intensive reformers in this 
respect the process is much less bumpier than in those countries which privatized their 
economy only partially (see Appendix 1). Further examining major changes in the values of 
the privatization measure, Hungary’s privatization revenues (normalized by GDP) increased 
sharply in 1995 resulting in a substantial improvement of the index (see Canning and Hare, 
1996). The index declines sharply for Macedonia in 1994 and 1995 for a number of reasons 
but principally because of a large reduction of credit to private sector as per cent of GDP 
which falls from 45 to 23 per cent from 1994 to 1995. 
Generally, the greatest privatization efforts seem to have been undertaken in Hungary, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic, while little privatization seem to have been attempted in 
                                                           
24 If we restrict sample to 1997-2001, the correlation is somewhat higher at 0.81 and 0.79 
excluding the outcome indicators. The correlation coefficient with 1989-1994 World Bank’s index is 
0.73 and 0.65 excluding the outcome indicators. The correlations are almost unchanged, if we use 
1989-1997 World Bank’s index. They are 0.71 and 0.69 without outcome indicators for our index. 
Finally, the correlation coefficient is 0.93 between our external liberalization index with and without 
outcome indicators.  
  22Belarus and Turkmenistan. We should also note that typically the values of our indexes are 
lower for privatization than for internal and external liberalization which hints at a specific 
reform sequence adopted by these countries that entailed leaving privatization for later. The 
correlation between our privatization index and those from the EBRD is 0.8 and 0.66 if we 
exclude the outcome indicators. If we restrict the sample to 1997-2001, the simple correlation 
coefficients are 0.82 and 0.64 (after the exclusion of outcome indicators). The correlation 
with 1989-1994 World Bank’s index is 0.52 and 0.43 after exclusion of outcome indicators. 
The correlation coefficient between our privatization index with and without the outcome 
indicators is 0.94.   
Figures 7 to 9 show that the verdict from our index of privatization efforts is also less 
optimistic than the assessment from the EBRD and World Bank. Interestingly, the difference 
between ours and the EBRD index for privatization is larger for CEEC, where we find 
relatively smaller progress in privatization. Again, CEEC countries seem to have been more 
aggressive privatization reformers than those in the CIS.  
 
4.  What difference do objective measures make? Determinants and reversals   
The objective of this section is to assess the usefulness and reliability of these new objective 
measures of reform. We try to do so in three ways: by studying the factors that explain reform 
dynamics; by analyzing the determinants of reform reversals; and by addressing the potential 
endogeneity of reform vis-à-vis growth by re-estimating various econometric models from 
the literature.  
 
4.1 Reform Determinants 
What are the main determinants of economic reform? Here we consider some of the key 
insights from the theoretical literature on the political economy of reform to throw light on 
  23the determinants of each of our three indicators. The literature discussed above has generated 
a number of hypotheses that have rarely been tested empirically so this is an important 
exercise in itself (Roland, 2000).
  One set of potential reasons is related to economic 
conditions: favourable changes in economic conditions (e.g., less unemployment) allow 
greater margins to the reforming government to compensate losers and thus implement “more 
reform” (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994). A closely related notion is that of the consequences 
of a sharp deterioration in economic conditions: an economic crisis will, almost by definition, 
increase the number of supporters (that is, potential winners) of reform (Fernandez and 
Rodrik, 1991). Another well understood set of reasons relate to politics, e.g., countries 
becoming more democratic would be able to implement more reform (because, for instance, 
repeated democratic elections allows the monitoring of compensation promises to -and by- 
potential losers). Further, in this particular context, less concentrated political power (an 
example would be communists loosing seats in Parliament) would be associated with the 
implementation of “more reform” (Hellman, 1998). 
Let us now turn to the econometric methodology. There are two main questions of 
interest: (a) what are the factors that determine the dynamics of reform across countries and 
over time? And (b) are the set of determinants the same for each of the three reform areas 
(namely, privatization, and external and internal liberalization)? While the rationale for the 
first question has already been presented, that for the latter is still needed. Based on the large 
case study evidence on reform dynamics cited above, on what we learned about this process 
in collecting the underlying data for our objective indexes and the attendant discussion with 
public officials, our prior is that these three reforms are driven by different factors. This is 
partly because we observe a distinct sequence of reforms. Internal liberalization happened 
immediately after the fall of communism (often with the exception of wage regulation). This 
was followed by external liberalization and then by privatization efforts. This sequence 
  24makes it unlikely that the same set of determinants would hold for each of our three different 
reforms measures. Moreover, if there were an identical set of determinants there will be little 
reason to focus on individual reforms, as an aggregate index would be a proper way to 
proceed. In our view, such strategy would not do justice to the complex dynamics we observe 
with respect to reform efforts across these countries over time (our results below corroborate 
this insight).  
In what follows, we will examine the determinants of each of the three reform areas 
separately.
25 We first estimate the following equation: 
        itc tc tc tc tc tc itc V IC Democracy Unempl GDPgrowth R ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0       (2)  
where  Ritc stands for our objective indexes of reform, with i denoting reform area 
(privatization, external or internal liberalization), t denoting year and c denoting country. 
GDPgrowthtc is the rate of real per capita GDP growth (in country c and year t), Unempltc is 
the unemployment rate, Democracytc is the Freedom House index of democracy (the 
continuous version from their Nations in Transit project),  ICtc is a principal components 
index of initial conditions
26 and Vtc is a vector of auxiliary control variables. We expect the 
coefficient on GDP growth, unemployment and initial conditions to be positive (the 
hypotheses are that faster growth, higher unemployment and more favourable initial 
conditions are more conducive to the implementation of reform) and expect the coefficient on 
democracy to be negative (the hypothesis being that democracy is more conducive to the 
implementation of reform). 
  Table 2 has our econometric results on the determinants of each of our three indexes 
of reform. The first three columns show these results for our internal liberalization index. In 
this case, the Hausman test indicates that the random-effects estimator is appropriate so we 
                                                           
25 A standard Hausman test is used to determine whether fixed- or random-effects estimator is 
appropriate. 
  25report accordingly.
27 The results in column 1 broadly confirm our hypotheses: GDP growth, 
unemployment and democracy all exert a positive and statistically significant impact on 
internal liberalization efforts. The addition of initial conditions (reported in the next column) 
has little impact on those coefficients. Yet, the results suggest that countries with more 
favourable initial conditions are more likely to implement internal liberalization reforms. 
Also notice the substantial increase in the R-squared once initial conditions are accounted for. 
In the third column we add a Herfindahl index of concentration of political power (referring 
to the number of seats in the lower house). Although this addition proves to be of interest (we 
find that in parliaments in which political power is less concentrated, reforms move farther), 
the coefficients on growth and unemployment are now less precisely estimated.     
  The next set of columns has the results for external liberalization. In this case we have 
a more robust set of determinants in that now GDP growth, unemployment and democracy all 
have the expected effects. It is interesting to note that while the effect of democracy is 
somewhat smaller for internal liberalization than for external liberalization and privatization, 
this is inverted with regard to initial conditions.
 We believe this is in part because of the 
timing of these reforms: internal liberalization takes root much faster than external and 
privatization, thus leaving little time to the process of democratization to play a fuller role 
(notice however that low concentration of political power
 is an important determinant in this 
respect) with a similar reasoning applying for the role of initial conditions on privatization 
(the latter generally takes place too late for the effect of those initial conditions to be fully 
felt). Also notice that we report that the growth of OECD countries, as a measure of global 
economic conditions, is an important reform determinant in this case: external liberalization 
is more likely to be implemented under favourable global economic conditions.
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 Initial conditions are a measure of the macroeconomic distortions as of 1989 and are 
constructed in line with, among others, EBRD (2002) and Merlevede (2003). 
  26As it also can be seen from Table 2, the results for privatization are in line with those 
for external liberalization. GDP growth, unemployment rates and initial conditions show a 
positive and significant impact, while the coefficient on democracy also accords to our priors. 
It should be noted that there are potentially important endogeneity issues to which we return 
in section 4.3. For example, the consistent result we obtain showing that higher 
unemployment rates are associated with more reform efforts can be understood in conflicting 
manners: it can well be that rising unemployment enlarges the ranks of potential winners and 
would thus increase the support for reform leading to the intensification of reform efforts 
(which is, as noted above, consistent with the Fernandez and Rodrik model) or it can be that 
reform directly causes a (temporary) increase in the rate of unemployment (consider the case 
of privatization).
 
We subjected the results above to various sensitivity checks (see Appendix 2). We 
find that greater inflation rates decrease external liberalization and privatization efforts (but 
not internal liberalization.)  We also investigate the role of financial (measured as the 
weighted average of exchange rate pressure and interest rate differentials) and do not find that 
it affects our reform indicators with the somewhat surprising exception of privatization 
(similarly, fiscal deficit is never statistically significant).
 We have also examined a number of 
political issues. EU negotiations (a dummy variable taking the value of 1 from the year when 
EU accession negotiations started) is found to affect positively external liberalization as well 
as privatization efforts, but not internal liberalization. This is maybe a consequence of price 
and wage liberalization occurring well before negotiations started. The occurrence of violent 
conflict was found to have a surprisingly limited impact: controlling for initial conditions in 
our baseline specifications, the coefficient on wars is statistically significant at conventional 
levels only for the case of privatization. Following Frye and Mansfield (2004), we create a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
27 There is very little difference with respect to the fixed-effects estimates (with the obvious 
  27variable capturing the electoral calendar (the number of years until elections). Surprisingly, 
we find little evidence for the timing of elections in driving any of our reform indicators 
except for external liberalization. Further, we employ various measures of changes in 
government’s ideological orientation to address the potential effects of political alternation on 
reform. For this purpose we use the number of ideological alternations (e.g., from center-left 
to center-right) and the number of leadership changes.
28 We find that cumulative leadership 
and political changes are positively associated with our three indexes of reform. Not 
surprisingly, for two of them (internal and privatization) we find that these measures of 
political alternation substitute for democracy as the latter becomes insignificant after the 
inclusion of any of the two alternation variables. Finally, we have undertaken a spatial 
econometrics exercise to examine the role of distance among countries. The idea here is to 
assess the possibility of reform contagion: whether countries are more likely to implement 
reform say because of learning from the experience of close neighbors or because reform in 
close neighbors directly induces domestic reform (consider the case of competition among 
countries for FDI inflows). However using a variety of such measures (distance from 
Brussels, distance between capital cities, whether or not previously part of the Soviet Union), 
we fail to find that reforms are driven by how much other “close” countries reform. In a 
nutshell, with the exception of the political and ideological alternation variables, we find no 
robust additional determinant of reform efforts, while our principal results remained 
unchanged. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
exception of the initial conditions measure, which is excluded by the latter).  
28 We are grateful to Branko Milanovic for these data. Ideological alternation is defined as any 
change of the government’s ideological orientation on a 16-cell ideological grid. Leadership change 
captures personal changes in the locus of power whether it is a change of prime minister (due for 
example to a change in the governing majority) or president. For details, see Hoff, Horowitz and 
Milanovic (2005). 
  284.2 Reform Reversals 
A second way to assess the usefulness and reliability of our objective reform indicators is to 
try to explain reform reversals. There are at least two motivations for this: one is that 
although reform reversals occupy a central place in the theoretical literature, there are to the 
best of our knowledge no systematic efforts to try to explain these reversals empirically. The 
potential reversibility of reforms plays a fundamental role in the theoretical normative 
political economy of reform literature. Most of the theoretical contributions in this line of 
research explicitly attempt to devise ways of designing reform packages that have a low 
probability of reversal (see, e.g., Dewatripont and Roland, 1995.)
29 The second motivation is 
that this gives us a way to assess the reliability of our new objective measures. It may well be 
the case that the larger number of reversals is not an indication of our indexes’ quality but, a 
critic may charge, they reflect the fact that these indexes are finely measured and small 
change in the underlying variables as well as country and time coverage may have an 
undesirably large impact on our measures. One way to try to put aside this concern is to 
explain reversals: if we can not provide a reasonable explanation then the critics may be right. 
We try to model reversals in two ways. In the first a reversal is simply defined as a decrease 
in the value of any of our three indexes in two consecutive years (a dependent dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a reversal occurred, and zero otherwise), while in the 
second we consider a particular measure of the severity or persistence of reversals, namely 
how many times reversals have occurred consecutively (the dependent variable is 1 when 
reversal occurred, 2 when reversals occurred in two consecutive years, and so on.)  
One feature of the available subjective indexes of reform is that, according to them, 
reform reversals seldom occur. Although this can of course be explained by well-informed 
                                                           
29 Some of the mechanisms devised to deal with this issue are compensating packages, gradual 
implementation of reform and adherence to institutions that commit to future transfers (or directly to 
the implementation of reforms associated with WTO or EU accession). 
  29policy-makers, other non-excludable explanations include that there may be political pressure 
on the international organizations constructing these indexes not to lower previous scores, or 
that national authorities mistakenly understand the survey questions as referring to their 
cumulative efforts. As such, the empirical analysis of reform reversals has been scarce 
especially vis-à-vis the central role it occupies in the theoretical literature. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only paper dealing with reform reversals is Merlevede (2003) who reports 21 
instances of reversals out of a total of 237 changes (in other words, only 8.9% of annual 
changes in the EBRD indexes are negative). Here we only use our three indicators. As 
mentioned above, in terms of our index of internal liberalization, we observe 42 reversals out 
of 295 annual changes (14.2%), in terms of our index of external liberalization we observe 61 
out of 300 (20.3%) and in terms of our index of privatization we observe 44 out of 243 
(18.1%). These ratios are much higher, indicating twice as many cases of reversals than 
before. As discussed, this can well be caused by the fact that our objective indicators are 
measuring reform too finely or it could also be caused by the non-availability of a few 
variables for that particular year (as the panel data set for the underlying variables is in some 
cases unbalanced). 
What explains reform reversals in these economies?
 30 It is important to note that in 
the empirical literature this question has not been raised, as Merlevede (2003) is concerned 
mainly about the impact of reversals on growth. One potential reason for reform reversals is 
unfavourable changes in economic conditions. An economic crisis or, more mildly, a sudden 
increase in unemployment or a sudden slowdown in growth rates may change the support for 
                                                           
30 Notice that this exercise differs from the one on reform dynamics above. The latter explains 
both positive and negatives variations from the mean. Its validity is an empirical question: if the set of 
determinants turns out to be different between reform efforts and reform reversals this should 
reinforce the confidence we can attach to our measures. The latter also captures a sense of the 
magnitude of these variations (including reversals of course). However, in this exercise we treat all 
reversals in the same way, giving them equal weight to small and large reversals in trying to explain 
their occurrence. In our view, this stacks the odds against our indicators and as such is a conservative 
test of their usefulness and reliability. 
  30reform and cause a reversal. Another potential reason is a change in political conditions. For 
instance, if we observe major turnovers of the leading party in government, then reversals are 
likely (a left-wing that succeeds a right-wing government may favour re-distribution or 
compensation).  
In this light, we estimate a random-effects logit model in which the dependent 
variables is coded 1 if there was a reform reversal in that indicator in that year for that 
country, and zero otherwise. In the following model we investigate political and economic 
factors as potential explanations for reform reversals: 
) ( ) 1 ( 4 3 2 1 0 tc tc tc tc itc V Democracy Unempl GDPgrowth reversal P β β β β β + + + + Φ = =         (3) 
where reversalitc is a binary variable indicating whether reform i in country c at year t has 
experienced a reversal (defined as a decline in the absolute value of the index); GDPgrowthtc 
is the rate of real per capita GDP growth (in country c and year t),  Unempltc  is the 
unemployment rate, Democracytc is the Freedom House index of democracy (the continuous 
version from their Nations in Transit); Vtc is a vector of auxiliary control variables; and Φ is 
the cumulative logistic distribution function. Note that this means we do not expect the 
reform determinants we found above to play an important role in the reversals case. By 
performing a separate analysis of the bottom-half of the distribution of our reform indicators 
we expect they are driven by different factors than the mean itself. If that turns out to be the 
case, we gather additional support for the reliability of our measures. Yet failing to explain 
reversals can work the other way as it would suggest that our measures are maybe too fine 
and are not reflecting changes in reform efforts but are picking up mostly noise. Accordingly, 
we should expect that the majority of the explanations will come from the vector of auxiliary 
control variables, ideally with individual variables playing a role for the reversals of each of 
our three individual reform measures.   
  31  The first columns of Table 3 show our baseline results for internal liberalization 
reversals. These seem driven primarily by political factors, specifically by a very direct form 
of protest (namely labour strikes).
 In some specifications, high rates of unemployment are 
associated with the likelihood of reversals, but this result is not robust. The significance of 
labour strikes points to the importance of a better grasp of political initial conditions in 
understanding reform dynamics. It also highlights the timing of reforms: because internal 
liberalization (according to our indexes) was implemented before external liberalization and 
privatization, the most effective way to revert internal liberalization may have been by direct 
influence.  
The results with respect to our two other indexes are also intuitive. We find that in 
terms of privatisation reversals the main explanatory factor are FDI inflows, while those 
factors explaining external liberalisation are average growth rates of OECD economies (an 
increase in those rates imply a higher probability of reversal), while terms of trade shocks 
show a negative impact in the probability of reversal.   
  Table 4 repeats these specifications but instead of explaining whether or not a reversal 
occurred, we try to understand the persistence of reform reversals. We report random-effects 
negative binomial estimates in which the dependent variable is the number of consecutive 
years for which we observe a reform reversal. Interestingly, the results for persistence are in 
line with those for reversals: labour strikes explain the persistence of internal liberalization 
reversals, OECD growth explains the persistence of external liberalization reversals and FDI 
inflows explains the persistence of privatization reversals. 
We subjected these results to a similar battery of sensitivity tests we subjected our 
reform determinants above. Although we find that our main results are indeed robust to the 
inclusion of a number of important variables, none of them proved to be systematically 
related to reform reversals. We find no systematic effects from inflation, financial crises, 
  32fiscal deficit, EU negotiations, war, the timing of elections, ideological alternations, the 
number of leadership changes, and distance from Brussels, distance between capital cities, 
whether or not previously part of the Soviet Union as measures of distance in out spatial 
econometrics exercise (see Appendix 2). The results are similar with respect to the 
persistence of reform reversals, with three exceptions. Two of them regarding the external 
liberalization index: we find that inflation and proximity as measured by being a former 
Soviet Union Republic increase the persistence (or severity) of external liberalization 
reversals. We also find that ideological alternation tends to increase the persistence of internal 
liberalization reversals. In sum, we find no robust additional determinants of reform reversals 
(or of their persistence), while our principal results remained unchanged. 
4.3 Endogeneity issues: Do the new objective indexes change existing results? 
We believe that the two sets of results above (on the determinants of reform dynamics and on 
reform reversals) suggest that our indexes are useful and reliable in helping further our 
understanding of reform. Yet, the literature on the economic effects of reform has long 
recognized that growth and reform may be jointly determined. The reform process is carried 
out in the expectation that its outcomes will translate into faster growth rates, while at the 
same time a growing economy enables a reformist government to compensate losers from 
reform and thus continue, or even intensify, the reform process itself. There is also the notion 
that the impact of reform on growth occurs with a time lag: the contemporaneous effect of 
reforms on growth may be negative, while at the same time the lagged effect may be positive. 
It is thus important to investigate what are the ultimate consequences, in terms of existing 
econometric results, of using our indexes. Moreover, our results so far do not reflect the 
concerns expressed in the more recent literature regarding endogeneity and robustness. One 
way to address such issues is to directly re-estimate some of the “reform equations” from the 
literature using our reform indicators instead and compare the ensuing coefficients. Also, 
  33there is now a somewhat sizable literature on the effects of reform on growth which has, 
generally speaking, found a positive impact of reform on growth when reform is proxied by 
the subjective indicators we discussed above. It is also important to investigate whether our 
objective indexes change these results.  
We select four well-known papers which report a “first-stage” reform equation. 
Notice that all of these are part of a system of equations (that is, they are all estimated jointly 
with a growth equation), which if reported in the original paper is also replicated in the 
present study. To this end, Table 5 contains the “reform equations,” while Table 6 has the 
corresponding “growth equations.” The reform equations we re-estimate are originally from 
Heybey-Murrell (1998), Merlevede (2003), Falcetti, Reiser and Sanfey (2002) and Kim and 
Pirttila (2003). It is worth noting that we use exactly the same variables in the replication 
with one exception, which is that we change the reform measure used by the authors with our 
aggregate index of reform.
31
Heybey and Murrel (1998) specify that reform (as measured by the World Bank 
indexes discussed above) is a function of economic growth, democracy as measure by the 
Freedom House index, the extent of initial economic liberalization and the share of 
manufacturing on GDP. Their results are reproduced in the second column of Table 5: 
although economic growth facilitates the implementation of economic reforms, an extensive 
history of reforms attempts seems to be a hindrance (maybe reflecting Kornai’s “reform 
windmill”). Using our reform indexes, we are able to reproduce their results with respect to 
the initial level of liberalization and indeed strengthen them in the sense that the coefficient is 
                                                           
31 In order to replicate these results we need to generate an aggregate index of overall reform 
effort (which is done using the Lora algorithm described above and averaging the three reform 
indexes we computed). 
  34larger and estimated more precisely. Yet, we could not reproduce the result for economic 
growth.
32  
Merlevede (2003) analyses the impact of reform reversals. The paper reports the 
coefficients from a reform equation and we are therefore able to replicate them using our 
indexes. Merlevede’s data show that reform (measure by the EBRD indexes) is driven by 
contemporaneous economic growth and democracy as measured by the inverted Freedom 
House (in the inverted index, higher figures indicate more democracy). He also reports that 
initial conditions matter in explaining reform dynamics. Using our reform indexes, we are 
able to replicate the finding that democracy is an important factor in driving reform. 
However, we do find that although contemporaneous growth is positively associated with 
reform progress, one-year lagged economic growth turns out to be inversely related to 
reform. The latter result is usually interpreted as supporting the notion that economic crises 
are important determinants of reform. Finally, we find little support for the role of initial 
conditions. 
  As it can also be seen from Table 5, one main difference between the reform equation 
by Falcetti, Reiser and Sanfey (2002) and that by Merlevede (2003) regards the 
comprehensiveness of initial conditions.
33 Otherwise, the two models are identical for 
practical purposes, especially because in Merlevede this one differing coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. Our reform indexes not only reproduce the growth effects reported 
by Falcetti et al., but they are also in this case estimated more precisely and the size of the 
coefficients is once again larger. The situation with respect to democracy is similar, though 
                                                           
32 The replication results for Heybey and Murrel’s growth equation is available upon request. 
33  Following this literature, we used the principal components method to cluster initial 
conditions in two groups: the first denoted by IC1 is interpreted as capturing the macroeconomic 
distortions inherited from socialism as the largest loadings are for the exchange rate black market 
premium before 1989, repressed inflation during 1987-90 and share of CMEA trade over GDP in 
1990. The second cluster of initial conditions, IC2, can be interpreted as the level of socialist 
development as the largest loadings are for real GDP per capita in 1989 and share of population in 
urban areas in 1990.  
  35the size of the coefficient is now smaller. One main difference we obtain when treating 
reform and growth as jointly determined is that we find little evidence supporting the notion 
that initial conditions play a significant role in explaining reform dynamics (recall that in 
section 4.1 above we find that initial conditions matter for reform dynamics, but that was 
without taking endogeneity into account). 
The last reform equation in Table 5 is from Kim and Pirttila (2003). It explains reform 
dynamics using various macroeconomic variables. More specifically, growth and budget 
surpluses are expected to foster reform efforts (because, for instance, both increase the 
government credibility in terms of compensating potential losers) and unemployment and 
inflation are expected to hinder reform efforts (because, for instance, both increase individual 
and aggregate uncertainty, as in Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). Our reform indexes not only 
reproduces the growth effect reported by Kim and Pirttila (2003), but have it estimated more 
precisely and, once again, the value of the coefficient is larger than in the original. 
Interestingly, however, we find opposite results with respect to unemployment: in ours, 
changes in the rate of unemployment (note that the Arellano-Bond estimates refers to 
variables in first-differences) are associated with an increase in reform efforts. Interestingly, 
the coefficients on inflation and unemployment both have the same sizes as in Kim and 
Pirttila, but also opposite signs.  
We now turn to the replication of the attendant growth equations to investigate 
whether using our objective reform indexes change existing results on the economic impact 
of reform. The growth equations we re-estimate are originally from Fidrmuc (2003), 
Merlevede (2003), Falcetti, Reiser and Sanfey (2002) and Kim and Pirttila (2003). In our 
view, these are representative of the best efforts available in trying to understand the growth 
implications of reform as they incorporate most of the insights from theory. For instance, 
these authors examine the dual effect of reform on growth (a positive lagged effect is 
  36normally found jointly with a negative contemporaneous effect), the separate importance of 
cumulative reform, and the role of initial conditions. 
  The specification from Fidrmuc (2003) has as main arguments contemporaneous 
reform, fiscal balance, school enrolment and investment rates, and involvement in armed 
conflict. The first column in Table 6 shows Fidrmuc’s original coefficients while the second 
column shows ours. As it can be seen, our reform indicators are able to replicate all the 
original results, but with our measure these coefficients turn out to be larger and more 
precisely estimated (notice that originally the coefficient on investment was not statistically 
different from zero.) 
  The specifications from Falcetti et al. (2002) and from Merlevede (2003) are similar. 
The main difference is the latter having an additional dimension for initial conditions as well 
as a dummy variable capturing the occurrence of reform reversals. From the Falcetti et al. 
equation, we are able to replicate and improve upon the reform results (again more precisely 
estimated and larger). Note however that using our indicators, we find little support for the 
role of initial conditions as well as for the role of fiscal balances.
34 The outcome is similar 
with respect to Merlevede’s specification: the coefficients on our objective reform indicator 
are more precisely estimated and larger in size than in the original paper.  
Finally, the results from Kim and Pirttila (2003) are shown in the last two columns. 
These authors argue that growth is mainly driven by reform, cumulative reform, fiscal 
balance, investment, and inflation. Using our objective reform indexes, we are again able to 
replicate these results although this was the only case in which our coefficients are slightly 
smaller and not in every case more precisely estimated.  
                                                           
34 It is important to keep in mind that in replicating these results, we have measured the 
variables used, mimic the specifications and chosen exactly the same estimators. In other words, to be 
the best of our abilities, everything else is exactly the same as in the original papers but the reform 
measures.  
  37In sum, our new objective measures of reform seem able to replicate key results from 
the literature. These new measures show a much stronger effect on growth (contemporaneous 
and lagged), but a smaller (yet still significant) effect of cumulative reform. Crucially, re-
estimating some of the main growth equations from the literature using these new measures 
provide less support for economic initial conditions (raising, among other issues, the 
possibility that political initial conditions maybe a more important aspect albeit largely 
neglected so far). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper tries to contribute to the growing literature on the political economy of reform. 
There have been very few efforts trying to take the many theoretical insights to the data. This 
is in part because reform is a political economy topic par excellence: reform is 
multidimensional and it is driven by the complex interplay of political and economic forces. 
The transition from communism to capitalism in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union 
is arguably the largest natural experiment on economic reform in recent history and it is 
paradoxical to say the least that efforts to systematically measure such reforms efforts have 
not emerged. In particular, the fact that objective indicators of reform are still unavailable is, 
in our view, a reason for serious concern. This paper tries to address this gap by constructing 
objective measures for three main reform areas in all transition economies for all years from 
1989 to 2001. Compared to the existing (subjective) indexes, our measures generate not only 
a less optimistic assessment of the reform process, but also depict this process as much less 
smooth than previously thought (more specifically, according to our measures reform 
reversals abound while that is not the case with the subjective measures). We also believe this 
is one of the first papers to try to implement the distinction between reform efforts inputs and 
outcomes. This distinction is important because the inclusion of outcome indicators can 
  38severely bias the resulting measures. Among the main determinants of reform, we find 
domestic growth for external liberalization and privatisation, concentration of political power 
for internal liberalisation, and democracy for all three of them. We also find that FDI inflows 
reduce the probability of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal 
liberalization reversals, and OECD growth increase the likelihood of an external 
liberalization reversal. Finally, we replicate the results from the main econometric studies of 
the effects of reform on growth and find that those effects, using our objective measures of 
reform, are larger, more precisely estimated and more robust. 
In terms of future work, the main suggestions we offer are as follows. First, it is 
important to provide objective indicators for more reforms, while simultaneously offering a 
more disaggregate look at the three main reforms we focused on here. For instance, future 
work should separate out wage from prices liberalization in order to throw light on what 
seems to be their very different dynamics. Our results give us reasons to suspect, for instance, 
that the factors explaining reversals in the two sub-components of our internal liberalization 
indexes will be rather different. In terms of additional reforms that we believe should be 
examined, those of a more institutional nature that fall under the heading “2
nd generation 
reforms” should be given top priority. These encompass important areas such as competition 
policy, anti-corruption initiatives and judiciary reform. The second main suggestion we offer 
for future research builds upon the first: to study interdependencies between the reform areas 
(that is, to focus on the issues of sequencing and speed of reforms). Because we have focused 
on few reform areas, the number of potential sequences of reform is limited. Further, because 
these are defined broadly there is maybe too blurred a consensus from the data on the actual 
choice of sequences. Future research would do well in examining the relationship between 
objective indicators of reform in more areas and attempt to identify differences in their 
sequencing and speed so as to allow a well-informed discussion (based on data and facts) of 
  39the possible relationship between the different reform speeds and sequences, on the one hand, 
and political development, reform outcomes and aggregate economic performance, on the 
other.  
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Table 1 
Variables Underlying Each of the Reform Indexes 
 
Reform Inputs  Reform Outcomes 
 
Internal Liberalization Index   
1.  Number of goods subject to price regulation (basket 
15 goods)  
3.  Share of administered prices in 
CPI 
  2.  Wage regulation 
External Liberalization Index   
1.  Compatibility with Article VIII 
2.  Controls on commercial credit 
3.  Controls on foreign direct investment 
4.  Controls on liquidation of FDI   
5.  Documentation requirements for release of foreign 
exchange for imports 
6.  Exchange rate taxes 
7.  Export duties as percent of tax revenue 
8.  Export licences 
9.  Export taxes 
10. Import licences and quotas 
11. Import tariff rate 
12. Interest rate liberalization 
13. Investment transactions 
14. Multiple exchange rates 
15. OECD membership 
16. Permission for foreign exchange accounts held 
abroad by residents  
17. Permission for foreign exchange accounts held 
domestically by residents 
18. Permission of foreign exchange accounts for non-
residents  
19. Repatriation requirements 
20. Repatriation requirements for invisible transactions  
 
21. Surrender requirements  
22. Surrender requirements for invisible transactions  
23. Tariff code lines  
24. WTO membership  
 
25. Share of trade with non-
transition countries 
26. Openness 
27. Import duties as % of tax 
revenue 
28. Tariff revenues as % of 
imports and taxes on 
international trade 
29. Taxes revenues from 
international trade 
 
Privatization Index   
1.  Privatisation revenues   
2.  Share of  small firms privatised 
3.  Asset share of private-owned banks (in per cent) 
4.  Total number of enterprises privatised   
5.  Total number of small and medium enterprises 
privatised   
6.  Total number of large enterprises privatised   
7.  Share of foreign-owned banks in total number of 
banks 
8.  Total number of private enterprises  
 
 
9.  Private sector share in GDP 
10. Credit to private sector   
11. Private sector investment as a 
share of GDP   
 








CH Index  
Internal Liberalization 
CH Index  
External Liberalization 
CH Index  
Privatization 
GDP growth  0.003**  0.003*  0.003  0.001*** 0.01***  0.007***  0.007***  0.007***  0.004*** 
   [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Unemployment 0.011***  0.014***  0.006  0.019*** 0.016***  0.017***  0.015***  0.011***  0.009*** 
   [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Democracy -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05***  -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
   [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.012]  [0.010]  [0.010] [0.010]  [0.010] [0.009] [0.001] 
Initial conditions    0.126***  0.112**    0.096***      0.062**  0.043* 
     [0.042]  [0.046]    [0.034]      [0.026]  [0.026] 
Herfindahl index      -0.123*             
       [0.064]             
OECD growth            0.055***      0.088*** 
             [0.013]      [0.015] 
Observations  262 262 189  264 264 244  247 247 227 
No. of countries  25  25  24  25  25  25  25  25  25 
R-squared  (overall)  0.07 0.16 0.16  0.38 0.47 0.42  0.27 0.31 0.36 








(0.43)  --- 
5.72 





Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10% level, ** Idem., 5% level, *** Idem., 1% level . Fixed effects estimates are 
presented, if the consistency of random effects is rejected by Hausman test at 5% level. 
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Table 3  
What explains reform reversals?  
Panel logit estimates 
 
 
CH Index Internal 
Reversal 
CH Index External 
Reversal 
CH Index Privatization 
Reversal 
Unemployment  0.045 0.050 0.038  0.062** 0.007  0.038 0.024 0.028 -0.029 
    [0.030] [0.040] [0.041]  [0.026] [0.027] [0.048] [0.027]  [0.031] [0.031] 
GDP growth  0.042  0.052*  0.058*  0.11**  0.031  0.002  -0.016  -0.012  -0.001 
    [0.028] [0.031] [0.031]  [0.054] [0.025] [0.034] [0.021]  [0.029] [0.029] 
Democracy  -0.042 -0.092 -0.076  -0.265 0.011  0.058  0.062 -0.029  -0.028 
    [0.109] [0.110] [0.041]  [0.213] [0.086] [0.151] [0.097]  [0.120] [0.125] 
Labor strikes    0.825**               
     [0.335]              
Labor strikes*Unempl.      0.112**             
       [0.040]             
Growth  OECD        1.28***  1.572***      
          [0.325]  [0.576]      
Terms of trade            -0.022*       
           [0.012]      
FDI            -0.229** -0.230** 
              [0.117]  [0.119] 
EU  negotiations             -0.026 
               [0.868] 
                
Observations  260 232 233  250 243  147 228 175  175 
No. of countries  25  24  24  23  25  25  25  25  25 
McFadden R-squared   0.13  0.24  0.25  0.41  0.25  0.69  0.10  0.33  0.33 
Method  RE RE RE  FE RE  RE RE RE  RE 

















(0.43)  --- 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10% level, ** Idem., 5% level, *** Idem., 1% level . Fixed effects estimates 
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Table 4  
What explains the persistence of reform reversals?  
Negative binomial estimates 
 
  
CH Index Internal 
 
CH Index External 
 
CH Index Privatization 
 
Unemployment  0.038 0.027 0.027 0.093* 0.001  0.019  0.023 0.023 0.023 
   0.030  0.066  0.036  0.048  0.021  0.041  0.026  0.026  0.026 
GDP growth  0.032  0.038  0.048*  0.079*** 0.052**  0.013  -0.009  -0.003  -0.033 
   0.026  0.032  0.028  0.024  0.022  0.031  0.019  0.025  0.025 
Democracy -0.053  -0.319*  -0.088  -0.150  0.055  0.098  0.600  -0.109  -0.021 
   0.016  0.193  0.013  0.174  0.075  0.132  0.093  0.103  0.107 
Labor strikes     0.647**                      
      0.261                      
Labor strikes*Unempl.        0.08***                   
         0.014                   
GrOECD              0.816***  1.21**          
               0.253  0.497          
Terms of trade                 -0.014          
                  0.01          
FDI                       -0.239** -0.238**
                        0.109  0.111 
EU negotiations                          -0.044 
                           0.784 
Observations 260  172  233  250  243  147  228  175  175 
No. of countries  25  17  24  23  25  25  25  25  23 
McFadden R-squared   0.09  0.25  0.24  0.41  0.22  0.72  0.11  0.35  0.34 
Method RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  RE  RE  RE  RE 
Hausman test  0.22  
 (p-value)  (0.97) --- 
7.01 











Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10% level, ** Idem., 5% level, *** Idem., 1% level . Fixed effects estimates are 














Replication of ‘Reform Equations’ 
 
  Heybey Murrell  Merlevede  Falcetti et al.  Kim Pirttila 
    Original Replica Original Replica Original Replica Original Replica 
Growth  0.006*** 0.006 0.056***  0.035***  0.08***  0.36***  0.002  0.003** 
    [0.002] [0.03] [0.004]  [0.001] [0.01]  [0.05] [0.002]  [0.001] 
Growth-lagged        -0.003  -0.011*** -0.01***  -0.12***       
         [0.002]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.04]       
Time*IC1        -0.34***  0.004  -0.02***  0.004       
         [0.091]  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.04]       
Time*IC2        -0.12  0.0001             
         [0.12]  [0.005]             
Freedom House  0.008  -0.014  0.81***  -0.049*** -0.15***  -0.05***       
   [0.005]  [0.1]  [0.32]  [0.014]  [0.06]  [0.01]       
Industry  0.13*  0.35                   
   [0.07]  [0.62]                   
Lib. Index 1989  -0.2***  -0.63***                   
   [0.05]  [0.23]                   
Inflation                    0.007  -0.007 
                     [0.01]  [0.02] 
Unemployment                    -0.03***  0.02*** 
                     [0.01]  [0.007] 
Gov. balance                    0.002  0.002 
                     [0.002]  [0.003] 
R-2/Chi-sqr.  0.48  0.35  770*** 123*** 434*** 123***  0.59  0.23 
Estimation      3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10% level, ** Idem., 5% level, *** Idem., 1% level. Original 
results of the authors are in the left column labelled as original, while replicated results are in the right column, 
labelled as replica.  
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Table 6  
Replication of ‘Growth Equations’ 
 
   Fidrmuc  Falcetti et al.  Merlevede  Kim Pirttila 
 Original  Replica 
 
Original Replica Original  Replica Original Replica 
Liberalization    23.3***  26.3***  -13.3 -48.6*** -8.35  -73.2***  -0.86  2.16 
 [6.65]  [4.1]  [8.26]  [13.5]  [10.84]  [19.1]  [0.81]  [1.74] 
Lib.Index (lag)       10.84***  52.7***  10.79**  75.1***     
     [3.99]  [11.6]  [4.82]  [16.7]    
Time*IC1      0.27*** 0.06 0.78***  0.12     
     [0.09]  [0.09]  [0.16]  [0.1]    
Time*IC2        0.11  -0.09    
        [0.23]  [0.12]    
Fiscal  0.073  0.16 0.34***  0.09  0.22**  0.08 0.38*** -0.09 
  [0.11] [0.11] [0.12]  [0.08]  [0.1]  [0.1]  [0.13]  [0.1] 
School    0.019  -0.02          
  [0.137]  [0.04]          
Investment  0.104  0.001**        0.24***  -0.0001 
  [0.244]  [0.0003]        [0.05]  [0.0002] 
War  -5.97***  -12.7***          
  [1.729]  [2.99]          
Reform  reversal          25.47*  111.7***    
        [13.55]  [28.1]    
Growth  –  lagged           0.37**  0.29*** 
           [0.11]  [0.1] 
Cum  Lib.  Index           9.04***  3.07* 
           [3.4]    [1.46] 
Fiscal  -  lagged          -0.92  0.55*** 
           [0.89]  [0.21] 
Inflation  -  lagged           0.52  0.01 
           [1.13]  [0.16] 
R2/Chi-squared  0.76  0.28 241*** 196*** 411***  170***  3263***  1238*** 
Estimation    FE  FE  3SLS  3SLS  3SLS  3SLS  AB  AB 
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10% level, ** Idem., 5% level, *** Idem., 1% level. Original results are in the left 
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Reform Indicators – Raw Data 
 
    
Table A1 
Input-only Yearly Index of Internal Liberalization for 25 Transition Economies (Lora transformation) 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  Average   
Albania  0 0 0 0  0.17  0.17  0.37  0.4  0.9  0.9  0.8  1 1  0.44 
Armenia  0  0  0  0.8  0.86 0.87  0.9  0.93 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.96  0.7 
Azerbaijan            0.22 0.56 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.58 0.58 0.91  0.69 
Belarus  0  0  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.5  0.58 0.65 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45  0.4 
Bulgaria  0  0.25 0.81 0.85 0.77 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.58  0.6  0.59 
Croatia  0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.83 0.83 0.61 0.61 0.95 0.94 0.98  0.78 
Czech Rep.  0  0  0.56  0.74 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91  0.69 
Estonia  0  0  1  1  1  0.86 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84  0.91 
Georgia  0  0  0  0.67 0.67 0.77  0.8  0.84 0.91 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.66 
Hungary  0.91 0.92 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94  0.84 
Kazakhstan 0  0  0.97  0.99 0.99 0.99  1  1  1  1 0.67  0.67 1  0.94 
Kyrgyzstan  0  0.05 0.53 0.67 0.73 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97  0.74 
Latvia  0  0  0  0.9  0.9  0.85 0.85 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88  0.67 
Lithuania  0  0  0  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93  0.56 
Macedonia 0.6  0.7  0.74  0.78 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.56 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.95  0.8 
Moldova  0.27 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.23  0.17 
Poland  0.57 0.81 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.66  1  0.63 
Romania  0  0.11 0.18 0.28 0.44  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.98 0.64 0.63 0.62  0.46 
Russia  0  0  0  0.27 0.27  0.3  0.33 0.33 0.83 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93  0.47 
Slovakia  0  0  0.2  0.33 0.48 0.48 0.82 0.82 0.49 0.52 0.85 0.87 0.87  0.52 
Slovenia  0.67 0.67 0.33 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.57 0.57  0.6  0.6  0.53 
Tajikistan  0  0  0.5  0.87 0.93 0.93 0.97  1  1  1  0.67 0.67 0.67  0.71 
Turkmenistan  0.63  0.4  0.4  0.66 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.74  0.5  0.56 0.56 0.58 0.58  0.6 
Ukraine  0  0  0  0.27 0.27  0.6  0.87 0.87 0.43 0.93  1  1  1  0.56 
Uzbekistan  0  0  1  1  0.83 0.33 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47  0.65 
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Table A2 
 Index of Internal Liberalization, Averaged 
Input-only versus Indexes Combining Inputs and Outcomes  
(Lora transformation) 
Whole Period versus Late Transition 
 
Combining Inputs and Outcomes  Input-only  Country 
1989-2001 1997-2001  1989-2001 1997-2001 
 
Albania 0.44  0.92  0.44  0.92 
Armenia 0.70  0.94  0.69  0.95 
Azerbaijan 0.69  0.78  0.58  0.70 
Belarus 0.40  0.44  0.39  0.30 
Bulgaria 0.59  0.59  0.57  0.47 
Croatia 0.78  0.82  0.74  0.74 
Czech Rep.  0.69 0.91  0.66 0.93 
Estonia 0.91  0.85  0.94  0.90 
Georgia 0.66  0.97  0.65  0.98 
Hungary 0.84  0.94  0.85  1.00 
Kazakhstan 0.94  0.87 0.92  0.80 
Kyrgyzstan 0.74  0.97  0.75  0.97 
Latvia 0.67  0.88  0.69  0.93 
Lithuania 0.56  0.93  0.56  0.93 
Macedonia 0.80  0.85 0.80  0.85 
Moldavia 0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17 
Poland 0.63  0.70  0.49  0.58 
Romania 0.46  0.69  0.33  0.59 
Russia 0.47  0.91  0.47  0.91 
Slovakia 0.52  0.72  0.48  0.67 
Slovenia 0.53  0.57  0.42  0.43 
Tajikistan 0.71  0.80  0.61  0.70 
Turkmenistan 0.60  0.55  0.42  0.37 
Ukraine 0.56  0.87  0.56  0.87 
Uzbekistan 0.65  0.47  0.65  0.47 
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Table A3 
Input-only Index of External Liberalization for 25 Transition Economies  (Lora transformation) 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  Average 
Albania  0  0  0  0 0.4  0.38 0.5  0.588  0.526  0.526 0.5  0.526  0.75  0.36 
Armenia  0  0  0  0 0.5  0.35  0.412  0.611 0.7  0.81 0.8 0.8  0.75  0.44 
Azerbaijan  0  0  0  0  0.31  0.33  0.316  0.421 0.5 0.5 0.5  0.412 0.5  0.29 
Belarus  0  0  0  0  0.24  0.19 0.313  0.25 0.143 0.095 0.095 0.095  0  0.11 
Bulgaria  0  0  0  0.33  0.5  0.47 0.471  0.5 0.476 0.571 0.571  0.7  1  0.43 
Croatia  0  0  0  0  0.39  0.44  0.5 0.556 0.667 0.619 0.667 0.667  1  0.42 
Czech  Rep.  0  0 0.25 0.25  0.5 0.5  0.688 0.778 0.762 0.81 0.75 0.75 1 0.54 
Estonia  0  0  0  0.33  0.19  0.56 0.688 0.833 0.857 0.857 0.952 0.895  1  0.55 
Georgia  0  0  0  0.33  0.47  0.47 0.471 0.706 0.762 0.714 0.762 0.632  1  0.49 
Hungary  0  0 0.25 0.25 0.56 0.53  0.588  0.765  0.619  0.571  0.667  0.6  1  0.49 
Kazakhstan  0 0 0 0  0.33  0.32 0.368 0.579 0.571 0.571 0.476  0.45 0.75  0.34 
Kyrgyzstan  0  0  0  0  0.8 0.81  0.938  0.875 0.85  0.857 0.81  0.842  1  0.60 
Latvia  0  0 0.33 0.33 0.77 0.84  0.842 0.85  0.857  0.857 0.95  0.947  1  0.66 
Lithuania  0  0  0  0  0.56  0.63 0.611 0.632 0.684 0.667 0.667  0.7  1  0.47 
Macedonia  0 0 0 0 0  0.28 0.278 0.278 0.476 0.524 0.571  0.55 0.75  0.28 
Moldova  0  0  0  0  0.38  0.28 0.389 0.389 0.381 0.381 0.429 0.421  1  0.31 
Poland  0  0 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.33  0.474  0.526  0.571  0.571 0.55 0.55  1  0.42 
Romania  0  0  0  0 0.44 0.38  0.438  0.438  0.5 0.55  0.524  0.526  1  0.37 
Russia  0  0  0  0 0.25 0.25  0.235  0.368  0.4 0.35  0.3  0.263 0.75  0.24 
Slovakia  0  0  0.25  0.25  0.38  0.47 0.588 0.556 0.524 0.571 0.619 0.579  1  0.44 
Slovenia  0  0  0.33  0.33  0.47  0.47 0.588  0.6 0.476 0.476 0.524 0.667  1  0.46 
Tajikistan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.5  0.5 0.15 
Turkmenistan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.5  0.25  0.25 0.08 
Ukraine  0  0  0  0 0.06 0.11  0.222  0.222  0.4  0.3 0.35 0.25 0.75  0.21 
Uzbekistan  0  0  0  0  0.2  0.19 0.176 0.316 0.238 0.238 0.238  0.1  0  0.13 




 Table  A4 
  Index of External Liberalization, Averaged 
Input-only versus Indexes  Combining Inputs and Outcomes 
(Lora transformation) 
Whole Period versus Late Transition 
 
Combining Inputs and Outcomes  Input-only  Country 
1989-2001 1997-2001  1989-2001  1997-2001 
 
Albania 0.34  0.49  0.36  0.57 
Armenia 0.41  0.65  0.44  0.77 
Azerbaijan 0.31  0.45  0.29  0.48 
Belarus 0.21  0.18  0.11  0.09 
Bulgaria 0.50  0.57  0.43  0.66 
Croatia 0.47  0.63  0.42  0.72 
Czech Rep.  0.50 0.70  0.54  0.81 
Estonia 0.54  0.79  0.55  0.91 
Georgia 0.46  0.66  0.49  0.77 
Hungary 0.54  0.60  0.49  0.69 
Kazakhstan 0.35  0.53 0.34  0.56 
Kyrgyzstan 0.54  0.74  0.60  0.87 
Latvia 0.59  0.76  0.66  0.92 
Lithuania 0.44  0.64  0.47  0.74 
Macedonia 0.32  0.51 0.28  0.57 
Moldavia 0.34  0.51  0.31  0.52 
Poland 0.39  0.55  0.42  0.65 
Romania 0.42  0.53  0.37  0.62 
Russia 0.28  0.41  0.24  0.41 
Slovakia 0.43  0.59  0.44  0.66 
Slovenia 0.46  0.57  0.46  0.63 
Tajikistan 0.22  0.45  0.15  0.35 
Turkmenistan 0.15  0.26  0.08  0.20 
Ukraine 0.22  0.38  0.21  0.41 
Uzbekistan 0.15  0.20  0.13  0.16 
  57 
Table A5  
Input-only Index of Privatization for 25 Transition Economies  (Lora transformation) 
  
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 Average 
Albania    0.21 0.62 0.66 0.47 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.43  0.52 0.55  0.46 
Armenia      0.09 0.16 0.25 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.53 0.66  0.70 0.73  0.43 
Azerbaijan  0.29    0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.34 0.35  0.31 0.31  0.24 
Belarus    0.00 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.17  0.19 0.28  0.12 
Bulgaria  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.37 0.47 0.55  0.68 0.72  0.31 
Croatia    0.01 0.15 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.45 0.45  0.61 0.66  0.33 
Czech Rep.    0.02  0.13  0.38 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.52 0.56  0.63 0.74  0.43 
Estonia    0.16 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.49 0.51  0.60 0.62  0.39 
Georgia  0.02 0.08 0.22 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.46 0.54 0.62 0.68  0.69 0.71  0.40 
Hungary  0.19 0.09 0.15 0.23 0.36 0.64 0.78 0.89 0.87 0.90  0.94 0.90  0.58 
Kazakhstan   0.41  0.36  0.13 0.18 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.59 0.64  0.69 0.68  0.44 
Kyrgyzstan  0.00 0.01 0.15 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.41 0.49 0.53 0.49  0.53 0.53  0.32 
Latvia          0.27 0.29 0.33 0.50 0.60 0.62  0.64 0.67  0.49 
Lithuania      0.06 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.31 0.50 0.49  0.55 0.58  0.33 
Macedonia     0.35  0.52 0.37 0.22 0.35 0.35 0.63 0.61  0.72 0.76  0.49 
Moldova      0.14 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.41 0.49 0.55  0.62 0.62  0.34 
Poland  0.63 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.48 0.59  0.67 0.69  0.41 
Romania    0.01 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.49  0.54 0.57  0.28 
Russia      0.02 0.03 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.41 0.40 0.35  0.07 0.08  0.20 
Slovakia    0.62 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.43 0.50 0.62 0.62 0.63  0.64 0.80  0.53 
Slovenia    0.01 0.08 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.28  0.30 0.27  0.21 
Tajikistan    0.00 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.28 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.53  0.51 0.52  0.30 
Turkmenistan        0.00 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.18  0.13 0.13  0.14 
Ukraine      0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.34 0.36  0.37 0.39  0.18 
Uzbekistan    0.00 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.29  0.17 0.09 
 
0.19 
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Table A6 
 Index of Privatization, Averaged 
Input-only versus Indexes Combining Inputs and Outcomes 
(Lora transformation) 
Whole Period versus Late Transition 
  
Combining Inputs and 
Outcomes 
 Input-only  Country 
1989-2001 1997-2001  1989-2001  1997-2001 
 
Armenia 0.33  0.47  0.43  0.61 
Azerbaijan 0.22  0.33  0.24  0.31 
Belarus 0.12  0.19  0.12  0.19 
Bulgaria 0.33  0.54  0.31  0.56 
Croatia 0.35  0.52  0.33  0.49 
Czech Rep.  0.46 0.66 0.43 0.59 
Estonia 0.41  0.57  0.39  0.52 
Georgia 0.36  0.59  0.40  0.65 
Hungary 0.58  0.84  0.58  0.90 
Kazakhstan 0.37  0.55 0.44 0.61 
Kyrgyzstan 0.31  0.47  0.32  0.52 
Latvia 0.38  0.58  0.49  0.61 
Lithuania 0.32  0.50  0.33  0.48 
Macedonia 0.41  0.54 0.49 0.61 
Moldova 0.29  0.48  0.34  0.54 
Poland 0.42  0.56  0.41  0.56 
Romania 0.32  0.46  0.28  0.45 
Russia 0.26  0.39  0.20  0.26 
Slovakia 0.52  0.73  0.53  0.66 
Slovenia 0.33  0.46  0.21  0.27 
Tajikistan 0.26  0.43  0.30  0.49 
Turkmenistan 0.12  0.16  0.14  0.17 
Ukraine 0.20  0.36  0.18  0.34 
Uzbekistan 0.22  0.30  0.19  0.21 





Table B1  
The determinants of internal liberalization  
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP  growth  0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (-0.002)  (-0.004)  (0.002)+  (0.002)+  (0.002)** (-0.002) (0.002)** (0.002)+ (0.002)+ 
Unemployment  0.009 0.002 0.01  0.011 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.011 
 (0.005)+  (-0.006)  (0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.005)** (0.005)+  (-0.005)  (0.005)** (0.005)** 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.04  0.0001  -0.041  -0.037  -0.038  -0.016  -0.024 -0.04 -0.039 
 (0.013)*  (-0.017)  (0.013)*  (0.013)*  (0.013)* (-0.014) (-0.015) (0.013)* (0.012)* 
Log  of  inflation -0.006          
  (-0.011)          
Financial crisis indicator  0.047               
    (-0.403)         
Fiscal  deficit     0.001        
     (-0.003)        
EU  negotiations      0.044       
      (-0.03)       
Electoral calendar        0.012      
       (-0.011)      
Leadership changes            0.107       
         (0.026)*     
Political alternation              0.079     
         (0.030)*    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.0001 
           (0.001) 
Constant  0.789 0.707 0.771 0.732 0.713 0.511 0.613 0.734 0.731 
 (0.098)*  (0.099)*  (0.087)*  (0.079)*  (0.078)* (0.098)* (0.093)* (0.092)* (0.077)* 
Observations  256 169 255 262 257 262 262 262 262 
No. of countries  25  21  25  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 




The determinants of external liberalization  
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP  growth  0.007 0.011 0.011  0.01  0.01  0.009  0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Unemployment  0.01  0.003 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.011  0.01  0.014 0.013 
  (0.003)*  -0.003  (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)** (0.004)* (0.004)* 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.061 -0.067 -0.055  -0.05 -0.057  -0.028 -0.034 -0.061 -0.06 
  (0.009)* (0.013)* (0.010)* (0.009)* (0.009)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.009)* (0.009)* 
Log  of  inflation -0.031          
  ( 0 . 0 0 7 ) *           
Financial  crisis  indicator  -0.076         
    - 0 . 5 5 8          
Fiscal  deficit     -0.001        
     - 0 . 0 0 2         
EU  negotiations      0.153       
      ( 0 . 0 3 5 ) *        
Electoral calendar        0.012      
       (0.007)+      
Leadership  changes  (cum.)       0.134     
        ( 0 . 0 1 8 ) *      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        0.119    
         ( 0 . 0 2 4 ) *     
Distance  between  capital  cities        0.0001   
          ( 0 . 0 0 1 )    
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.0001 
           ( 0 . 0 0 1 )  
Constant  0.722 0.726  0.56  0.532 0.531 0.282 0.374  0.54  0.6 
  (0.068)* (0.071)* (0.063)* (0.060)* (0.068)* (0.071)* (0.070)* (0.073)* (0.070)* 
Observations  258 169 257 264 259 264 264 264 264 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 




The determinants of privatization 
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP  growth  0.002 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 (0.001)**  (0.003)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* 
Unemployment  0.004 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.008 
  -0.002  (0.003)** (0.002)* (0.002)** (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)+ (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Freedom H. Index  -0.031  -0.045  -0.031  -0.016 -0.034 -0.004 -0.005 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.008)*  (0.011)*  (0.008)*  (0.008)**  (0.008)* -0.009  -0.009 (0.008)*  (0.008)* 
Log  of  inflation -0.044          
  (0.005)*          
Financial crisis indicator  0.859               
    (0.363)**         
Fiscal  deficit     0.001        
     -0.002            
EU  negotiations      0.228       
      (0.028)*       
Electoral calendar        0.009      
       -0.006      
Leadership changes (cum.)          0.119       
        (0.016)*     
Political  alternation  (cum.)        0.126    
         (0.020)*    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.0001 
           (0.001) 
Constant  0.604 0.483  0.422 0.34 0.404 0.13 0.195  0.464  0.399 
 (0.048)*  (0.057)*  (0.047)*  (0.049)*  (0.048)* (0.057)** (0.058)* (0.058)* (0.049)* 
Observations  243 168 245 247 242 247 247 247 247 
No. of countries  25  21  25  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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Table B4  
The determinants of internal liberalization reversals 
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP  growth  0.058 0.006 0.045 0.052 0.057  0.05  0.05  0.052 0.052 
  -0.036 -0.049 -0.033  (0.031)+  (0.032)+ -0.032  -0.031 (0.031)+  (0.031)+ 
Unemployment  0.065 0.055 0.053  0.05  0.052 0.051  0.04  0.049  0.05 
  -0.041  -0.048  -0.041  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04  -0.041  -0.04 -0.04 
Freedom H. Index  -0.12  0.032  -0.081  -0.091 -0.071 -0.048 -0.004 -0.092 -0.092 
  -0.117 -0.147 -0.111 -0.121 -0.113 -0.147  -0.14  -0.11  -0.11 
Strikes    0.826 2.042 0.822 0.825 0.823 0.823 0.735 0.825 0.822 
 (0.340)**  (0.694)*  (0.337)**  (0.336)**  (0.341)** (0.336)** (0.350)** (0.335)** (0.338)** 
Log  of  inflation  0.1          
  - 0 . 1 3 8           
Financial  crisis  indicator  51.428         
    -38.022         
Fiscal  deficit     0.024        
     - 0 . 0 4 6         
EU  negotiations      0.004       
      -0.549       
Electoral calendar         0.015        
       -0.143      
Leadership  changes  (cum.)       0.124     
        - 0 . 2 8      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        0.275    
         -0.264    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.0001 
           - 0 . 0 0 2  
Constant -2.462  -2.508  -2  -2.054  -2.143 -2.422 -2.629 -2.039 -2.033 
  (0.806)* (0.796)* (0.660)* (0.697)* (0.692)* (1.062)** (0.872)* (0.965)** (0.751)* 
Observations  228 161 231 232 227 232 232 232 232 
No.  of  countries  24 20 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
 




The determinants of external liberalization reversals 
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP  growth  0.052 0.042 0.032  0.03  0.031 0.033 0.029 0.033 0.027 
 (0.029)+  -0.038  -0.025  -0.025  -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 
Unemployment  0.02  0.001 0.005 0.007 0.004  0  0.015 0.004 0.009 
 -0.029  -0.029  -0.027  -0.027  -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 
Freedom  H.  Index  0.014 -0.026 0.023  0  0.005 -0.073  -0.067 0.012 0.011 
 -0.09  -0.113  -0.087  -0.095  -0.088 -0.125 -0.112 -0.086 -0.086 
OECD  growth  1.367 0.927 1.314 1.296  1.29  1.347 1.329 1.268 1.321 
 (0.331)*  (0.374)**  (0.331)*  (0.331)*  (0.329)* (0.336)* (0.331)* (0.326)* (0.334)* 
Log  of  inflation 0.155          
  -0.115          
Financial  crisis  indicator  -8.547         
    -8.027         
Fiscal  deficit     -0.024        
     -0.035        
EU  negotiations      -0.148       
      -0.551       
Electoral calendar         0.025        
       -0.104      
Leadership changes (cum.)          -0.233       
           -0.254      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        -0.276    
         -0.258    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           -0.006 
           ( 0 . 0 0 3 ) * *  
Constant -5.84  -3.737  -5.186  -4.951  -4.988 -4.438 -4.557 -4.353  -4.4 
 (1.250)*  (1.251)*  (1.151)*  (1.098)*  (1.126)* (1.228)* (1.157)* (1.304)* (1.139)* 
Observations  237 151 236 243 241 243 243 243 243 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
 




The determinants of privatization reversals 
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP growth  -0.02  -0.045  -0.015  -0.012  -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.003 -0.008 
  -0.033 -0.051  -0.03  -0.029 -0.029  -0.03 -0.029  -0.03  -0.029 
Unemployment  0.005  0.04  0.028 0.029 0.029 0.021 0.035  0.02  0.024 
  -0.036 -0.041 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 
Freedom H. Index  -0.025  -0.099  -0.025  -0.028 -0.033 -0.115 -0.09  -0.016 -0.026 
  -0.123 -0.208  -0.12  -0.125 -0.126 -0.159 -0.153 -0.122 -0.121 
FDI  -0.24  -0.42 -0.228 -0.23 -0.229  -0.198  -0.219  -0.228 -0.228 
  (0.127)+ (0.195)** (0.116)** (0.119)+ (0.117)** (0.119)+ (0.117)+ (0.116)** (0.116)+ 
Log  of  inflation  -0.092          
  - 0 . 1 6           
Financial crisis 
indicator    40.373         
    -34.376         
Fiscal  deficit     0.015        
     - 0 . 0 3 8         
EU  negotiations      0.026       
      -0.868       
Electoral calendar         0.014        
       -0.133      
Leadership changes (cum.)          -0.288       
        -0.345     
Political  alternation  (cum.)        -0.223    
         - 0 . 3 5 3     
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.005 
           - 0 . 0 0 5  
Constant -0.651  -0.693  -1.13  -1.198  -1.208 -0.479 -0.797 0.315  -1.694 
 -1.005  -0.96  -0.724  (0.720)+  (0.717)+ -1.1  -0.932 -1.153  (0.852)** 
Observations  172 126 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
 





The determinants of the persistence of internal liberalization reversals  
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP  growth  0.058 -0.006 0.039 0.043 0.046 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.042 
 (0.032)+  -0.043  -0.03  -0.029  -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 
Unemployment  0.056 0.043 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.044 0.027 0.045 0.048 
  -0.035 -0.041 -0.038 -0.039 -0.038 -0.038 -0.037 -0.038 -0.039 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.172 0.004  -0.14  -0.15  -0.131 -0.074 -0.024 -0.147 -0.146 
  (0.103)+  -0.133 -0.108 -0.112 -0.109 -0.136 -0.122 -0.107 -0.107 
Strikes  0.896 1.39 0.824  0.804  0.813 0.81 0.768  0.811  0.788 
  (0.179)* (0.242)* (0.259)* (0.250)* (0.254)* (0.242)* (0.198)* (0.247)* (0.252)* 
Log  of  inflation 0.156          
  - 0 . 1 0 9           
Financial  crisis  indicator  16.879         
    -12.974         
Fiscal  deficit     0.012        
     - 0 . 0 4 5         
EU  negotiations      -0.071       
      - 0 . 4 6 4        
Electoral calendar        0.027      
       - 0 . 1 2 8       
Leadership  changes  (cum.)       0.203     
        - 0 . 2 3 7      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        0.383    
         ( 0 . 2 1 3 ) +     
Distance  between  capital  cities        0.0001   
          ( 0 . 0 0 1 )    
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           -0.001 
           - 0 . 0 0 2  
Constant  -1.401 -0.693 -0.665 -0.624 -0.736 -1.192 -1.464 -0.973  -0.49 
  -0.862 -1.141 -0.921 -0.938 -0.955 -1.152 -0.916  -1.09  -0.992 
Observations  228 161 231 232 227 232 232 232 232 
No.  of  countries  24 20 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
 





The determinants of the  persistence of external liberalization reversals  
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP  growth  0.072 0.069 0.049 0.052 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.054  0.05 
  (0.024)* (0.033)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.027)** (0.022)** 
Unemployment 0.012  -0.003  0  0.001  -0.004  -0.003  0.006  0.087  0.002 
  -0.021 -0.025 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021  (0.051)+  -0.021 
Freedom H. Index  0.051  0.032  0.063  0.055  0.05  0.015  0  -0.094  0.057 
  -0.066 -0.092 -0.067 -0.075 -0.067 -0.096 -0.085 -0.204 -0.067 
OECD  growth  0.888 0.534 0.817 0.816 0.819 0.847 0.848 0.688 0.831 
  (0.250)* (0.283)+ (0.249)* (0.253)* (0.251)* (0.255)* (0.252)*  (0.268)**  (0.251)* 
Log  of  inflation  0.155          
  (0.084)+          
Financial  crisis  indicator    -7.438         
    - 6 . 4 3 3          
Fiscal  deficit     -0.002        
     - 0 . 0 3         
EU  negotiations      0.002       
      -0.422       
Electoral calendar        0.006      
       -0.081      
Leadership  changes  (cum.)       -0.113     
        - 0 . 2      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        -0.202    
         -0.201    
Distance  between  capital  cities         0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           -0.004 
           ( 0 . 0 0 2 ) +  
Constant  4.858  12.532  9.736  10.497  5.239 9.444 2.861 4.843  10.616 
  -48.102 -667.583 -510.242 -474.889  -66.19  -561.459  -20.573  -195.138 -442.249 
Observations  237 151 236 243 241 243 243 231 243 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25 
 
25 25 25 25 23 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 





The determinants of the  persistence of privatization reversals  
Random-effects panel estimates 
 
GDP  growth  -0.011 -0.018 -0.006  -0.003 -0.003 -0.002  -0.004  0.002  0.001 
  (-0.028) (-0.042) (-0.025)  (-0.025)  (-0.025)  (-0.025) (-0.025) (-0.026)  (-0.025) 
Unemployment  0.005 0.033 0.022  0.023  0.022  0.017 0.03  0.017  0.019 
  (-0.032) (-0.035) (-0.026)  (-0.026)  (-0.027)  (-0.026) (-0.027) (-0.026)  (-0.027) 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.012 -0.051 -0.017  -0.02 -0.015 -0.09  -0.089  -0.011  -0.017 
  (-0.108) (-0.175) (-0.104)  (-0.107)  (-0.109)  (-0.133) (-0.13)  (-0.104)  (-0.105) 
FDI  -0.256 -0.406 -0.238  -0.238  -0.239 -0.209  -0.226  -0.232 -0.238 
  (0.118)** (0.171)** (0.109)**  (0.111)**  (0.109)** (0.111)+  (0.108)**  (0.112)** (0.109)** 
Log  of  inflation  -0.089              
  (-0.136)              
Financial crisis indicator  32.118               
   (-28.317)              
Fiscal  deficit     0.013           
     (-0.033)           
EU  negotiations      -0.044         
      (-0.784)         
Electoral  calendar        -0.014       
        (-0.112)       
Leadership changes (cum.)          -0.249       
          (-0.293)      
Political alternation (cum.)            -0.265     
            (-0.311)     
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
             (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU              0.004 
              ( - 0 . 0 0 4 )  
Constant  11.788 14.803 11.931  11.784  11.755  12.693 12.821  3.52 13.55 
 -737.865  (1,153.991)  -769.76  -657.948  -762.545  -714.062  (1,024.420)  -6.657  -496.707 
Observations  172 126 175  175  175  175 175 175  175 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25  25  25  25 25 25  25 
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